- (Evidence) Hearsay testimony from a previous deposition could not be used to raise a triable issue of material fact at the summary judgment stage because it was inadmissible at trial. Herman Murphy v. Marques Alexander Pina (No. B327197 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV08149 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Three Filed October 16, 2025)
- (Default Judgment) Where evidence supported proper substituted service at defendant’s usual place of business, and defendant’s contrary claims were inconsistent, default judgment was valid, and trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to vacate. Helen Lee v. Charlene Yan (No. B340352 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV46869 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed October 31, 2025)
- (Constitutional Law) By regulating discriminatory conduct rather than suppressing protected expression, the statute safeguarding long-term care residents from repeated misgendering survived constitutional challenge. Taking Offense v. State of California (No. S270535 Third Appellate District C088485 Sacramento County Superior Court 34-2017-80002749-CU-WM-GDS Filed November 6, 2025)
- (Default Judgment) Where plaintiff left summons with a bus washer lacking authority or connection to the defendant’s business, substituted service was invalid and default judgment was vacated. Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc. (No. B333047 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV30249 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed November 6, 2025)
- (Mediation and Attorney Fees Provision) Initial refusal to mediate did not forfeit the refusing party’s right to recover attorneys’ fees under contract requiring pre-filing mediation where refusal was retracted prior to commencement of an action. Sequoia Evleshin v. Stephen Meyer (No. H051869 Santa Crus County Super. Ct. No. 21CV01686 California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District Filed November 6, 2025)
- (MICRA) Trial court properly reduced jury award by calculating defendant’s 15-percent fault after applying $250,000 MICRA cap. Adria Snover v. Aruna Gupta (No. A172568 Riverside County Super. Ct. No. RIC1905783 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Four Filed November 18, 2025)
The above court decisions came to our attention during this last month. Please find below a summary of the court opinions for your consideration.
- (Evidence) Hearsay testimony from a previous deposition could not be used to raise a triable issue of material fact at the summary judgment stage because it was inadmissible at trial. Herman Murphy v. Marques Alexander Pina (No. B327197 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV08149 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Three Filed October 16, 2025)
Defendant stole a car from an autobody shop owned by his grandmother. While driving with a passenger, the defendant crashed. The plaintiff suffered a brain injury. Roughly two and half years later, the plaintiff died of a fentanyl overdose. The decedant’s parents sued several defendants, including the defendant’s grandmother and her business. During a deposition taken in the lawsuit filed prior to the decedent’s death, the decedent testified that the defendant told him that the vehicle had been given to him by his grandmother and family members with whom the defendant was working. Defendants objected to this testimony as hearsay, and the trial court excluded the testimony. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants and an appeal followed.
The appeals court affirmed finding that a party may not raise a triable issue of fact on summary judgment by relying on evidence that would not be admissible at trial. Such evidence cannot be properly considered in ruling on a summary judgment motion. This includes evidence that would be barred at trial by the hearsay rule. Here, the challenged deposition testimony presented was hearsay. The defendant’s purported statements to the decedent did not fall under any hearsay exception, nor were they admissible. Because such evidence could not be introduced at trial, it could not be used to raise a triable issue of fact on summary judgment.
- (Default Judgment) Where evidence supported proper substituted service at defendant’s usual place of business, and defendant’s contrary claims were inconsistent, default judgment was valid, and trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to vacate. Helen Lee v. Charlene Yan (No. B340352 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV46869 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed October 31, 2025)
The plaintiff’s process server attempted service at the defendant’s usual place of business and at the business address which is on her real estate license regarding a pending lawsuit. However, the process server was told each time that the defendant was not in at this time. By the fifth attempt, the process server left the document with the office administrator while also mailing it to that address. The defendant did not respond to the complaint, and the trial court entered a default judgment in November of 2020. Two years later, plaintiff levied the defendant’s bank account. In 2024, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment under Code of Civil Procedures section 473(d), arguing the judgment was void for improper service, and declared that she had no position with the realty company where service was made. The trial court denied the motion, finding the service was proper. The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, it noted that a judgment may be vacated under section 473(d) only if it is void on its face or void for lack of proper service. Proper substituted service requires leaving documents for the person “apparently in charge” at the defendant’s usual place of business, followed by mailing copies to that address. A sworn proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption of proper service under Evidence Code section 647, and the defendant has the burden of overcoming that presumption with credible, consistent, and specific evidence. In this matter, the trial court properly found that the service was valid. The process server’s declaration satisfied all statutory requirements, and the defendant’s own declarations were internally inconsistent and lacked credibility. Though the defendant initially claimed she had no position at the business, she later admitted that she had been a licensed agent there since 2016 and was listed as a chief executive officer in 2023. Her vague assertion that she was an independent agent working from home in 2020 was unsupported by the evidence and failed to explain her ongoing association with the business. Moreover, the office administrator’s repeated statements that the defendant was not in at the time implied that she was still working there. Because service complied with section 415.20(b), it was valid. Accordingly, the judgment was not void, and section 473(d) relief was unavailable.
- (Constitutional Law) By regulating discriminatory conduct rather than suppressing protected expression, the statute safeguarding long-term care residents from repeated misgendering survived constitutional challenge. Taking Offense v. State of California (No. S270535 Third Appellate District C088485 Sacramento County Superior Court 34-2017-80002749-CU-WM-GDS Filed November 6, 2025)
California’s Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights (“Act”) safeguards LGBT seniors from discrimination in residential and medical care facilities. One provision, within the Act prohibits staff from willfully and repeatedly failing to use a resident’s preferred name or pronouns after being clearly informed, and when such conduct stems from bias. Prior to the statute taking effect, the Plaintiff, an organization opposing gender identity laws petitioned for a writ of mandate, contending that the pronoun provision violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The trial court denied the petition, finding
the provision a valid content-neutral anti-discrimination measure. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the statute imposed a content-based restriction that could not withstand strict scrutiny. The State of California sought review.
The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded with directions. It found that the statute’s narrow context regulated conduct, not pure speech as it addressed harassing discriminatory behavior rather than isolated or inadvertent statements. Accordingly, The California Supreme Court found the provision constitutionally regulated discriminatory conduct without impermissibly burdening protected speech.
- (Default Judgment) Where plaintiff left summons with a bus washer lacking authority or connection to the defendant’s business, substituted service was invalid and default judgment was vacated. Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc. (No. B333047 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV30249 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed November 6, 2025)
Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against defendant. The defendant moved to quash service and to vacate the default judgment on the grounds the judgment was void due improper service of process. The defendant appealed from the trial court’s order denying its motion, contending the trial court erred in denying it relief because the plaintiff failed to effectuate substituted service in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20.
The appeals court concluded that the entry of default and entry of default judgment were void due to improper service of process on the defendant. There was insufficient evidence that attempted substituted service was properly effectuated on a person apparently in charge of the defendant’s business office. The defendant presented evidence that the individual who received the summons and complaint neither worked for the defendant, nor had any connection to its office operation or its CEO. The plaintiff offered no contrary evidence establishing that the person had authority or responsibility that made him apparently in charge. Without proper substituted service, the subsequent mailing did not cure the defect. Accordingly, service under section 415.20(a) was valid.
- (Mediation and Attorney Fees Provision) Initial refusal to mediate did not forfeit the refusing party’s right to recover attorneys’ fees under contract requiring pre-filing mediation where refusal was retracted prior to commencement of an action. Sequoia Evleshin v. Stephen Meyer (No. H051869 Santa Crus County Super. Ct. No. 21CV01686 California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District Filed November 6, 2025)
Plaintiffs and defendants entered into a Residential Purchase Agreement. The agreement provided that the prevailing party in a legal action would be entitled to recovery reasonable attorney fees. The agreement provided also that parties agree to mediate any dispute arising from the Agreement, and that the fourth sentence of that paragraph provided if a party before commencement of an action refuses to mediate after a request has been made, then that party would not be entitled to recover its attorney fees. Following a dispute between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiffs requested that the defendant mediate their claim. The defendants refused, but six weeks later, before an action had been filed, they told the plaintiffs they were willing to mediate. The plaintiffs filed suit two days later. The defendants prevailed at trial and sought their fees. The trial court denied their request, concluding that they had refused to mediate after requests had been made and thereby forfeited their right under the Agreement for reasonable attorney’s fees.
The appeals court reversed and remanded the matter. The court found that under the Agreement that a party may recover fees, even if it refuses a pre-filing request to mediate, so long as it subsequently expresses a willingness to mediate prior to any action being filed. This interpretation avoids automatic forfeiture regardless of a party’s retraction, which is to be avoided where reasonably possible in contract interpretation.
- (MICRA) Trial court properly reduced jury award by calculating defendant’s 15-percent fault after applying $250,000 MICRA cap. Adria Snover v. Aruna Gupta (No. A172568 Riverside County Super. Ct. No. RIC1905783 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Four Filed November 18, 2025)
Plaintiff suffered complications secondary to giving birth at Defendant’s Hospital. Before trial, plaintiff settled with one of the defendant doctors as well as the hospital. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff almost $7.5 million in economic damages and $10 million in noneconomic challenges. The trial court reduced the award to account for the pretrial settlements and the jury’s finding that the defendant that went to trial bore 15 percent responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court calculated damages by applying Gilman v. Beverly California Corp. (1991) 231 Cal. App.3d 121. It calculated noneconomic liability by first reducing the damage award to $250,000 pursuant to the former Civil Code section 3333.2 (the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, or MICRA). The plaintiff appealed arguing the court should have reversed the order of operations, first multiplying the $10 million by 15 percent, and then capped at $250,000 under the prior MICRA law at the time.
The appeals court affirmed finding that if all defendants had gone to trial, the noneconomic damages would have been capped at $250,000 and would have been divided amongst them based on the jury’s allocation of fault. Therefore, the defendant doctor who went to trial was only liable for 15 percent of the $250,000 cap.
Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.