California Law Update – July/August 2025

1. 1. (Motion for Summary Judgment) Timely motion for summary judgment must be heard regardless of local court rules or calendaring issues. CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Peter Bedford) (No. E085583 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Two Filed July 10, 2025)
   2. (Causation) Alternative-causation-theory burden-shifting was not applicable where plaintiff failed to establish causation element as to property owner’s purported negligence. Anthony Mitchell v. Gail B. Hutchinson (No. G063331 Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-01173441 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed July 10, 2025)
   3. (Restraining Orders) Res judicata and collateral estoppel were inapplicable when restraining order judgment had no preclusive effect on government employee’s dismissal which was based on his abusive and dishonest conduct. Jonathan Egelston v. State Personnel Board (2d Civil. No. B337182 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six Filed July 15, 2025)
   4. (MICRA) General negligence’s two-year statute of limitations, not the Medical Injury Compensation Act’s statute of limitations, applied to driver’s claim from being rear-ended by an ambulance. Francisco Gutierrez v. Uriel Tostado (No S283128 Sixth Appellate District H049983 Santa Clara County Superior Court 20CV361400 Filed July 31, 2025)
   5. (Elder Abuse Act) No Elder Abuse Act violation against nursing facility physician when physician’s interaction with patient was limited, not amounting to a “robust” caregiver relationship as required by the statute. James Frankland v. Siamak Etehad (No. B338370 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23STCV09176 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Five Filed August 8, 2025)
   6. (Settlement Agreements) Where there were “outward manifestation” presenting triable issues of material fact surrounding whether the parties’ consented to contract, granting summary adjudication was error. Gary Birdsall v. Barton Helfet (No. A170596 San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC-21-594428 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Two Filed August 11, 2025)
   7. (Arbitration) Ruiz v. Podolsky did not require plaintiffs to arbitrate their wrongful death claim regarding defendant nursing facility’s alleged neglect of their son’s basic welfare and safety needs. Jonie A. Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (No. S285429 Second Appellate District, Division Two B323237 Los Angeles County Superior Court 22STCV01945 Filed August 14, 2025)
   8. (Terminating Sanctions) Despite defendant’s pro per status, trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting terminating sanctions when evidence supported defendant’s noncompliance with discovery obligations warranted its imposition. Joyce Faye Atlas v. Mike H. Davidyan (No. B335661 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV14481 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed August 29, 2025)

The above court decisions came to our attention during this last month. Please find below a summary of the court opinions for your consideration.

1. (Motion for Summary Judgment) Timely motion for summary judgment must be heard regardless of local court rules or calendaring issues. CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Peter Bedford) (No. E085583 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Two Filed July 10, 2025)

Defendant was involved in a lawsuit concerning its desire to seek to impose an easement across a local airport. Trial was set for May 2, 2025. In November 2024, the defendant reserved an April 1, 2025, hearing date for their motion for summary judgment via the Riverside County Superior Court Reservation System. The defendant filed and served its motion on January 10, 2025, 81 days before the hearing date and more than 30 days before trial. Under Riverside County Superior Court Local Rule 3310, however, motions were required to be filed no more than 10 days after reserving the hearing date. On January 13, the defendant was notified that the hearing date had been cancelled and the motion rejected because of Rule 3310. The defendant subsequently moved to specially set the motion for hearing, which was denied.

The defendant petitioned the appellate division for relief.

The petition was granted. The appeals court found that the defendant reserved the hearing 6 months ahead of time and filed a timely motion for summary judgment 81 days before the hearing date, but because defendant failed to comply with Local Rule 3310, the court removed the selected hearing date from the calendar. Accordingly, the rule operated to prevent a timely motion for summary judgment from being heard, and so, regardless of local rules, the motion should have been set for another hearing date. Trial courts may not refuse to consider a timely motion for summary judgment. Even local rules and practices may not prevent the filing and hearing of such a motion. A calendaring issue may not serve as a basis for refusing to hear a timely motion filed with the court.

2. (Causation) Alternative-causation-theory burden-shifting was not applicable where plaintiff failed to establish causation element as to property owner’s purported negligence. Anthony Mitchell v. Gail B. Hutchinson (No. G063331 Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-01173441 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed July 10, 2025)

This case involved application of the alternative liability theory of causation-first approved by the California Supreme Court in the landmark case of Summers v. Tice (1948), in the context of a summary judgment motion. While driving his motor vehicle on a street, plaintiff ran over and dragged with the underside of his vehicle one or more large rocks that had rolled onto the roadway from the adjacent slope, causing extensive damage to the under carriage of the vehicle and unspecified personal injuries. Unable to determine the precise location from where the rocks fell, plaintiffs elected to sue multiple parties, each of whom owned a portion of the slope, for negligence and premises liability.

One of the defendants moved for summary judgment on the issue of causation. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed.

The appeals court affirmed. It found that the defendant met its initial burden pursuant to code of Civil Procedures section 437c, subdivision (p)(2) by showing plaintiff could not prove the element of causation to both of their causes of action for premises liability and negligence. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to whether the rocks came from the defendant’s property or, alternatively, whether the defendant and the other owners of the adjacent hillside acted negligently in maintaining the slopes such that the burden of proof on the issue of causation would shift to defendants at trial under Summers. Because plaintiffs did neither, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment.

Under the alternative causation theory, though plaintiffs typically bear the burden of establishing causation, in cases where the evidence shows multiple defendants acting tortiously toward the plaintiffs, the burden of proof of causation may shift to the tortfeasors. When it is clear that one of them caused the injury, it becomes each defendant’s responsibility to prove they were not the cause. Here, this theory was inapplicable; it was only relevant if the moving defendant was proven to be a wrongdoer. Since this defendant met that burden, the expert testimony attesting that it was impossible to tell which property the rocks fell from, thus showing that the plaintiff could not prove causation element in her case. The burden then shifted back to the plaintiff to show there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the rocks came from the moving defendant’s property or whether she was a joint tortfeasor. The plaintiff’s expert only concluded that the rocks likely came from one of the three defendants, and the rest of the evidence was conclusory or speculative.

3. (Restraining Orders) Res judicata and collateral estoppel were inapplicable when restraining order judgment had no preclusive effect on government employee’s dismissal which was based on his abusive and dishonest conduct. Jonathan Egelston v. State Personnel Board (2d Civil. No. B337182 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six Filed July 15, 2025)

Plaintiff worked for The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) as a youth correctional officer. The plaintiff’s girlfriend called the police, stating that he had assaulted her and she was eventually granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) against him. Felony charges were later filed against the plaintiff. Plaintiff sought a TRO against his girlfriend, arguing he was defending himself from his girlfriend’s attacks. Both restraining orders requests were ultimately dismissed, but the CDCR investigated and determined that the plaintiff’s abusive actions against his girlfriend, along with his dishonest statements during the investigation, violated rules and policies. Accordingly, CDCR served him with a notice of adverse action, dismissing him from his position. An administrative law judge upheld the dismissal. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s writ petition and appealed. The plaintiff argued that because the family court had dismissed his girlfriend’s restraining order request, res judicata and collateral estoppel barred the assault claims.

The appeals court affirmed finding that neither res judicata or collateral estoppel applied. Res judicata and collateral estoppel required the claims or issues’ essential elements to be the same. Here, both proceedings involved different parties, who had diverging interests: one sought redress with personal harm, whereas the other sought redress for public harm resulting from the plaintiff violating his employment duties. Also, the restraining order request was dismissed without prejudice, which meant that it was not a final decision on the merits and therefore had no preclusive effect.

4. (MICRA) General negligence’s two-year statute of limitations, not the Medical Injury Compensation Act’s statute of limitations, applied to driver’s claim from being rear-ended by an ambulance. Francisco Gutierrez v. Uriel Tostado (No S283128 Sixth Appellate District H049983 Santa Clara County Superior Court 20CV361400 Filed July 31, 2025)

The California Supreme Court granted review of this matter to decide whether the statute of limitations for medical negligence claims within the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)’s applied to action for negligence brought by the injured driver of a vehicle rear-ended by an ambulance transporting a patient. The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court holding that MICRA statute of limitations did not apply under the circumstances.

The California Supreme Court’s ruling follows from principles articulated in its previous decisions concerning the scope of MICRA’s statute of limitations, as well as the general rule that the applicable limitations depends on the nature of the right being sued upon. Where, as here, plaintiff sued a health care provider for breach of duty owed to the public generally, as opposed to a violation of professional obligations owed to patients, the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence claims applied. Because the Court of Appeal concluded that the MICRA statute of limitations applied in this matter, the California Supreme Court reversed its judgment and remanded the proceedings consistent with its opinion. The underlying facts involved a truck that was rear-ended by an ambulance supporting a patient. The plaintiff sued the driver and the ambulance company for general negligence, alleging that he suffered personal injury and property damage due to the collision. The Defendants moved for summary judgment based upon MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

5. (Elder Abuse Act) No Elder Abuse Act violation against nursing facility physician when physician’s interaction with patient was limited, not amounting to a “robust” caregiver relationship as required by the statute. James Frankland v. Siamak Etehad (No. B338370 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23STCV09176 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Five Filed August 8, 2025)

The Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act) authorizes elders (persons 65 years of age) who suffered neglect or financial abuse at the hands of people acting with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice to obtain heightened remedies in a civil suit for damages. The Act explicitly excludes from its reach an elder’s claim for injury or damages against a health care provider based on that provider’s alleged professional negligence. The question before the appellate court was whether an elder can state a claim under the Act for neglect or financial abuse against a physician based solely on that physician’s negligent medical services while the elder resided at a skilled nursing facility. The appeals court held the answer was “no”. The Act limits neglect to the negligent failure of any person having care or custody of any elder, and a physician’s conduct in providing negligent medical services to an elder residing at a skilled nursing facility does not without more constitute neglect because that physician lacks the requisite robust caretaking or custodial relationship with the elder as defined in the Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) and is accordingly being sued for no more than his professional negligence. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the physician after sustaining a demurrer to the neglect and financial abuse claims under the Act.

6. (Settlement Agreements) Where there were “outward manifestation” presenting triable issues of material fact surrounding whether the parties’ consented to contract, granting summary adjudication was error. Gary Birdsall v. Barton Helfet (No. A170596 San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC-21-594428 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Two Filed August 11, 2025)

Plaintiff was stopped on a bridge when his vehicle was rear-ended by the defendant. The plaintiff and his wife retained an attorney who initiated contact with the defendant’s insurer and who, prior to filing suit, sent the insurer a policy limits demand of $100,000. The demand stated that the deadline to accept was 31 days later, by which the insurer had to send the attorney three items: (1) a standard bodily injury release to be executed by the plaintiff (2) a settlement draft and check payable to the plaintiffs and their attorney, and (3) and evidence confirming the policy limits.

Six days before the deadline, the insurance company faxed to the attorney a letter that claimed at the top in large boldface it was a “CLAIM SETTLEMENT,” and the first line which read, “We accept our offer and agree to pay $100,000”. The letter also included a standard release and certified proof of the policy limits. The next day, the insurer sent by overnight mail the $100,000 check, payable as requested. Then, four days before the deadline, the insurer faxed another letter to the attorney stating that all three conditions had been met and asking the attorney to contact him if anything else was required. The attorney did not respond.

Meanwhile, the insurer learned that the release enclosed in the acceptance letter had the plaintiff releasing the defendant and the plaintiff spouse listing her as a releasee rather than a releasor and send the attorney a corrected version of the release that was received by the attorney 65 minutes after the 3:00 p.m. deadline on the 31st day. The next day, the attorney sent a letter to the insurance company complaining that original release was not satisfactory and that the corrected the release too late.

The attorney thereafter filed a lawsuit for the plaintiff. Defendant’s answer included several affirmative defenses, one of which was a settlement in another of which was comparative fault based upon the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt. The plaintiffs moved for summary judication of the settlement defense, which the law and motion judge granted, and a judge to whom the case was assigned for trial did not allow evidence on the failure to wear a seat belt and refused the defendant’s instructions on the issue. Against that background the case proceeded to a jury verdict that awarded the plaintiff multimillion dollars. The defendants appealed, asserting two arguments, that the trial court erred in granting summary judication of the settlement defense and precluding evidence of, and instruction regarding the plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt.

The appeals court agreed with both arguments and reversed. On summary judgment/adjudication motion, the appellate court noted that it is the trial court’s duty to determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact. It found that the parties’ actions showed that there were triable issues as to whether the offer was accepted and whether there was mutual consent or intent to contract. Given that the insurance company sent a fax to correct the release, a reasonable person could conclude that the insurance company intended to contract. These issues should therefore have been presented to the trier of fact rather than summarily dismissed. Finally, the appellate court highlighted that public policy favors and encourages settlement agreements. Accordingly, the trial court was found to have erred in granting summary adjudication in favor of the plaintiff regarding the settlement agreement.

7. (Arbitration) Ruiz v. Podolsky did not require plaintiffs to arbitrate their wrongful death claim regarding defendant nursing facility’s alleged neglect of their son’s basic welfare and safety needs. Jonie A. Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (No. S285429 Second Appellate District, Division Two B323237 Los Angeles County Superior Court 22STCV01945 Filed August 14, 2025)

This matter came before the California Supreme Court concerning application of its prior 2010 ruling in Ruiz v. Podolsky, wherein the California Supreme Court identified an exception to a general rule that plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate their disputes if they have not previously agreed to arbitration. In Ruiz, the California Supreme Court held that if the patient agreed to arbitrate medical malpractice disputes in compliance with the arbitration provision of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) (codified as Code of Civil Procedure section 1295), the patient-provider agreement may bind the patient’s heirs in a wrongful death action, even if the heirs themselves never agree to arbitration. In the present matter the plaintiff sued a skilled nursing facility alleging that the facility’s neglect caused their son’s death. Before his death, plaintiffs’ son had signed an agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice disputes against the facility. Parting company with appellate courts that had taken different approaches to the issue, the Court of Appeal held that the patient-provider agreement bound plaintiffs because their wrongful death claim based on the nursing facility’s neglect was necessarily a claim about the way the health care provider rendered its professional services.

The California Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals decision in this case extended Ruiz past statutory bounds. Ruiz does not apply to every type of wrongful death claim that might be brought against the health care provider – particularly a provider that, like the skilled nursing facility in this case, provided both medical care and day-to-day custodial care of dependent adults. Under Ruiz, plaintiffs’ claim must be submitted to arbitration only if they are raising a dispute about medical malpractice as that term is defined in MICRA’s arbitration provision – that is, a dispute as whether any medical services were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered. The Ruiz decision did not require plaintiffs to arbitrate their disputes about a facility’s neglect of a resident’s basic welfare and safety needs.

To the extent the plaintiffs’ complaint in this case failed to detail whether they are alleging deficiencies in the nursing facility’s rendered of medical services or instead in its provision of custodial care, the California Supreme Court concluded the plaintiff should be permitted to amend their complaint to specify. Therefore, the California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

8. (Terminating Sanctions) Despite defendant’s pro per status, trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting terminating sanctions when evidence supported defendant’s noncompliance with discovery obligations warranted its imposition. Joyce Faye Atlas v. Mike H. Davidyan (No. B335661 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV14481 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed August 29, 2025)

Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the defendant. The default judgment was entered as a termination sanction based upon the defendant’s noncompliance with obligations under the discovery statutes. The defendant represented himself in pro per. During the discovery phase of the case, plaintiff filed a total of nine motions to compel discovery responses and for discovery sanctions. The trial court issued a series of orders, initially declined to impose sanctions and gave defendant multiple extensions of time to respond; then issued several orders imposing monetary sanctions and setting compliance deadlines; then, finding that defendant’s continued noncompliance was willful, imposed issue sanctions, and finally terminating sanctions striking the defendant’s answer.

The defendant argued that imposing a “doomsday” sanction was an abuse of discretion because his written discovery responses, while imperfect, were in substantial compliance, and that he had made “substantially justified” objections to deposition questions and interrogatories.

On appeal, the court found no merit in the defendant’s claims and affirmed the judgment of the trial court in all respects. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, trial courts may award or impose sanctions for the misuse of the discovery process. In imposing sanctions, trial courts must begin with the least damaging (monetary) and then progress to ultimate sanction: termination. When determining whether sanctions were appropriately imposed, the appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion. The trial court gave this defendant leeway and the trial court further appropriately imposed and increased sanctions with each step of the defendant’s disregard of the discovery requests and orders. Terminating sanctions were imposed only after defendant’s continued noncompliance. The defendant provided inadequate and tardy responses, failed to appear for scheduled depositions twice, and refused to answer without justification, giving evasive and inconsistent answers. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that, rather than abuse of discretion, the trial court’s actions were the model of discretion.

Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.