- (Fed/State Med Mal Law Conflict) When state’s affidavit-of-merit requirement for medical malpractice actions conflicted with federal rules regulating the same civil procedure, federal rules prevailed. Supreme Court of the United States; Berk v. Choy (No. 24-440 Argued October 6, 2025-Decided January 20, 2026)
- (Five Year Rule) Civil defendant’s failure to object to trial date beyond statutory period for bringing action to trial was not an agreement to extend the deadline, necessitating dismissal once the period expired. Teresa Randolph v. Trustee of the California State University (No. C102901 Super. Ct. No. 19CV01226 California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Filed January 15, 2026)
- (998 Offer) 998 settlement offer contingent upon acceptance by defendant’s insurer was valid because settlement with parties defended by insurers are always implicitly premised on such conditions. Maynard Matthews v. Patrick Ryan (B335736, B338256, B339211 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV10899 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed January 28, 2026)
- (DMV Disclosure) Driver’s license holder’s procedural due process rights were not violated by Department of Motor Vehicle’s refusal to disclose identity of third-party reporter who requested reevaluation of licensee’s ability to drive. Richard Louis Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles (No. C102554 Super. Ct. No. 24WM000142 California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Filed January 30, 2026)
The above court decisions came to our attention during this last month. Please find below a summary of the court opinions for your consideration.
- (Fed/State Med Mal Law Conflict) When state’s affidavit-of-merit requirement for medical malpractice actions conflicted with federal rules regulating the same civil procedure, federal rules prevailed. Supreme Court of the United States; Berk v. Choy (No. 24-440 Argued October 6, 2025-Decided January 20, 2026)
In this matter, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a Delaware law that required an affidavit of merit accompanied by a civil complaint in medical malpractice matters including in federal court was enforceable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Delaware law provided that a plaintiff could not sue for medical malpractice unless a medical professional attested to the suit’s merits in an affidavit of merit that accompanied the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff sued the defendant physician and medical center in federal court for medical malpractice under Delaware law but failed to provide the affidavit of merit required by Delaware law. The medical center and physician argued that the Delaware law was not enforceable in federal court because it is displaced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to comply with Delaware’s affidavit law. The Third Circuit affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed finding that Delaware’s affidavit law did not apply in Federal Court. When a plaintiff brings a state law claim in federal court, the court faces a choice of law problem: whether to apply state or federal law. The Rules of Decision Act directs federal courts to apply state substantive law unless the Constitution, a treaty, or a statute otherwise requires or provides. When a valid Federal Rule of Civil Procedures is on point, it displaces contrary state law even if the state law would qualify as substantive law. The analysis is straightforward: The Court first asks whether a Federal Rule answers the disputed question. If a Federal Rule does, it governs, unless it exceeds statutory authorization or Congress’s rulemaking power. In this case, the Federal Rule does not require anything aside from a plain statement of the claim showing that an individual is entitled to relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Delaware of merit affidavit rule was unenforceable in federal court as it countered the federal law requirement.
- (Five Year Rule) Civil defendant’s failure to object to trial date beyond statutory period for bringing action to trial was not an agreement to extend the deadline, necessitating dismissal once the period expired. Teresa Randolph v. Trustee of the California State University (No. C102901 Super. Ct. No. 19CV01226 California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Filed January 15, 2026)
Plaintiff sued a former employer and several others for claims related to employment discrimination. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon the plaintiff’s failure to bring the action to trial within five-and-a-half-year statutory deadline under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 and Judicial Council emergency rule 10. The plaintiff appealed, asserting the trial court erred because defendants orally stipulated to an extension of the statutory deadline by not objecting to the trial court’s setting the trial date beyond the deadline. The appeals court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s ruling. It found that a defendant simply agreeing to a continuance of the trial was not an oral agreement to extend the five-and-half-year rule. In this matter there was no transcript from the hearing where the trial date was set beyond the mandatory deadline. Nothing in the court’s minute order from the conference indicated an agreement to a trial date beyond the statutory deadline. Where a minute order is silent on any discussion relating to the trial date, courts may not infer that the defendant expressly agreed to a new trial date. Accordingly, the dismissal was mandatory.
- (998 Offer) 998 settlement offer contingent upon acceptance by defendant’s insurer was valid because settlement with parties defended by insurers are always implicitly premised on such conditions. Maynard Matthews v. Patrick Ryan (B335736, B338256, B339211 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV10899 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed January 28, 2026)
Defendant appealed from judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in an action arising from an automobile accident. Plaintiff cross-appealed from two postjudgment orders, one denying their request for prejudgment interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and Civil Code section 3291, and one denying a request for cost of proof under the California Civil Discovery Act.
Plaintiffs contended that the trial court erred in finding that their pretrial settlement offer invalid under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, because it was conditioned on the consent of the defendant’s insurer. The appeals court agreed with the plaintiffs. A defending insurer is not bound by a settlement to which it does not consent. Thus, the defending insurer’s consent was not necessarily a condition of settlement whether so stated in the settlement offer. Plaintiffs’ express inclusion of that condition in their offer was redundant and did not render the offer invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Because the trial court did not address defendant’s contention that the plaintiffs’ offer was unreasonable and in bad faith, the appeals court remanded the matter back to the trial court to address this issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and the order denying costs of proof and reversed the order denying prejudgment interest under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and Civil Code section 3291.
- (DMV Disclosure) Driver’s license holder’s procedural due process rights were not violated by Department of Motor Vehicle’s refusal to disclose identity of third-party reporter who requested reevaluation of licensee’s ability to drive. Richard Louis Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles (No. C102554 Super. Ct. No. 24WM000142 California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Filed January 30, 2026)
The DMV temporarily suspended the appellant’s driver’s license after conducting a driver re-examination initiated by an undisclosed third-party reporter. The appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate with the trial court demanding the department provide the name of the reporter; the trial court denied the petition. On appeal,
the appellant contended the nondisclosure of the reporter’s identity violated due process. The appellate court affirmed.
By way of background, an undisclosed third party reporter filed a form with the DMV to reevaluate the appellant’s driving ability. The DMV required him to submit to a medical evaluation. The appellant’s physician reported no observable impairments affecting driving but recommended a driving test. At a hearing, the appellant was told he needed to take the written and driving test. The appellant failed the driving test and his license was suspended. The following day, a different hearing officer concluded that the appellant should not have been subjected to testing because no medical basis existed and reinstated his license. The appellant then filed its petition for writ of mandate seeking disclosure of reporter’s identity and criminal prosecution of the reporter for allegedly submitting false information. The trial court denied the petition, concluding the public interest in maintaining reporter confidentiality outweighed the appellant’s interest in disclosure and the appellant appealed.
The appeals court found that the appellant’s due process rights were not violated. Although a driver’s license is a protected property interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation from nondisclosure of the reporter’s entity was low: the procedures afforded to the appellant were notice, a hearing before suspension, an opportunity to retest, and a prompt second hearing that resulted in reinstatement sufficient minimizing any risk of erroneous deprivation. Based upon informant privilege principles, due process did not require disclosure of an informant’s identity where the informant was not a material witness.
Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.