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California Law Update – April/May 2026

By May 31, 2026June 30th, 2026Law Updates
  1. (Privette Doctrine) Neither the “retained control” exception nor Cal-OSHA regulations created an exception to the general rule that firer was not liable for independent contractor’s work injury. Leonardo Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Company, Inc. (No. A173024 San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 22-Civ-03331 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division One Filed April 10, 2026)
  2. (Attorney Work Product) Trial court erred in determining defendant’s scope of attorney-client and work product privilege waiver arising from defendant placing a workplace investigation at issue. Michelle Paknad v. The Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara (No. H052652 Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV350641 California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District Filed April 17, 2026)
  3. (Evidence) Declaration in English supporting summary judgment motion was incompetent because the person signing it could not speak or write English, and there was no indication an interpreter had translated it. Brian S. Detrick v. Keiko Shimada (No. B344461 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV33977 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed April 28, 2026)
  4. (Coming and Going Rule) Hybrid in-office/remote employee driving from home to office was merely commuting to work at the time of traffic collision, not shuttling between worksites, so employer was not liable for employee’s negligence. Kai-Lin Chang v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (No. B340770 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22CHCV01194 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed April 28, 2026)
  5. (Confidentiality of Medical Information Act) Though Confidentiality of Medical Information Act breaches do not require proof medical information was actually viewed, educational technology company was not a covered health care provider. J.M., a minor, etc. v. Illuminate Education, Inc. (No. S286699 Second Appellate District, Division Six B327683 Ventura County Superior Court 56-2022-00567324-CU-MC-VTA)
  6. (Motion for Summary Judgment) Inadmissible evidence could not create a triable issue of material fact at summary judgment stage, so plaintiff failed to show City had constructive knowledge of dangerous condition on its property. Edwin Sargenti v. City of Long Beach (Noo. B340275 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV04367 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Seven Filed May 15, 2026)
  7. (Judges) Bad-faith blanket challenges seeking to disqualify a judge violate separation of powers, so a timely objection on those grounds allows courts to examine the reasons underlying such challenges. J.O v. The Superior Court (San Joaquin County Public Conservator) (No. S287285 Third Appellate District C102071 San Joaquin County Superior Court STK-MH-LPSC-2016-0000110 Filed May 28, 2026)

The above court decisions came to our attention during this last month. Please find below a summary of the court opinions for your consideration.

  1. (Privette Doctrine) Neither the “retained control” exception nor Cal-OSHA regulations created an exception to the general rule that firer was not liable for independent contractor’s work injury. Leonardo Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Company, Inc. (No. A173024 San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 22-Civ-03331 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division One Filed April 10, 2026)

Plaintiff who worked for a subcontractor was injured while working on a pedestrian bridge project. The defendant was the “turnkey” contractor on the job. The plaintiff sued the general contractor for damages for his industrial injuries, and the defendant eventually moved for, and the trial court granted, summary judgment on the basis of the Privette doctrine, which creates a strong presumption under California law that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for work place safety, which means that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.

The plaintiff maintained that the Privette doctrine presumption did not apply in this case and advanced two arguments in this regard. Pertinent to the holding in this case, the plaintiff argued that Cal-OSHA (Lab Code, section 6300 et seq) regulation imposed a nondelegable duty on the defendant to address the site conditions that assertedly caused him to fall. A second issue, and more of a factual matter, was that the defendant did not delegate workplace safety to the subcontractor. Plaintiff further maintained that even if the Privette doctrine presumption did apply, there were triable issues as to whether the retained control exception to the Privette doctrine applied. The appeals court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the specific Cal-OSHA regulations cited stood as an exception to the general rules, as the Privette doctrine encompasses duties imposed by regulatory provisions. It further found that the retained control exception did not apply because there was no evidence that the defendant contractor directed that the subcontractor performed its work in a certain way or interfered with the means and methods by which the work was to be accomplished.

  1. (Attorney Work Product) Trial court erred in determining defendant’s scope of attorney-client and work product privilege waiver arising from defendant placing a workplace investigation at issue. Michelle Paknad v. The Superior Court of California County of Santa Clara (No. H052652 Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV350641 California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District Filed April 17, 2026)

Plaintiff made formal complaints of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation after she was employed and terminated by defendant company. Defendant retained an attorney to investigate. The attorney interviewed witnesses, reviewed documents, and produced two reports containing her findings and conclusions. The defendant conveyed a summary of findings to the plaintiff but did not share the underlying reports. After her termination, the plaintiff sued. In asserting avoidable consequences as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendant cited the attorney investigations and touted their thoroughness and independence. The appeals court later determined in a mandamus petition that the defendant waived core attorney work product by placing the investigations at issue. The only material entitled to work product protection was discussions of unrelated cases, or of specific legal-not-factual issues or strategies. The parties continued to contest the scope of waiver and whether it extended to core work product. The trial court ultimately ordered disclosure of the investigative materials subject to the defendant’s proposed redactions. Later, upon an in-camera review of the materials and redactions, the trial court found that the defendant’s redactions were not discoverable as they were all attorney impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories.

The plaintiff sought mandamus relief once again.

The appeals court granted the petition. The appellate court determined that both of the parties misinterpreted the scope of its prior order with the defendant advancing broad protections and the plaintiff arguing for minimal redactions. It ultimately ordered further in-camera review regarding whether the redactions were within the scope of the waiver, consisting of all of the actual findings about the plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, and information in the reports and underlying investigative materials bearing on the scope or adequacy of the investigations.

The appeals court noted that generally, once an employer puts the adequacy of an investigation directly at issue in response to an employee’s lawsuit, that employer cannot stand on the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine to preclude a thorough examination of the investigation’s adequacy. Both the attorney-client communication and work product protection can be waived, but the scope of the waiver depends on the factual circumstances.

  1. (Evidence) Declaration in English supporting summary judgment motion was incompetent because the person signing it could not speak or write English, and there was no indication an interpreter had translated it. Brian S. Detrick v. Keiko Shimada (No. B344461 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV33977 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed April 28, 2026)

Plaintiff, an attorney, appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of his former client. After the client voluntarily dismissed a malpractice suit against the plaintiff, the plaintiff sued for malicious prosecution. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing by declaration that she had dismissed the malpractice suit because of the statute of limitations, a procedural basis for dismissal, precluded a malicious prosecution action. The defendant objected to the declaration as incompetent because the plaintiff could not read or speak English, and she provided no attestation from an interpreter or translator certifying the declaration accurately reflected the plaintiff’s words. The trial court overruled the objection, concluding the Evidence Code provisions pertaining to interpreters did not apply to declarations, and granted summary judgment.

The appeals court reversed finding that the trial court erred in overruling the defendant’s objection. The Evidence Code disqualifies witnesses who cannot be understood directly or through an interpreter pursuant to Evidence Code section 701, subd. (a)(1). It was undisputed that the plaintiff could not read, write, or speak English thus her competence as a witness depended on an interpreter as an intermediary. The plaintiff provided no evidence as to the identity or qualifications of her interpreter, nor any kind of attestation from the interpreter that the declaration accurately reflected her words. The declaration therefore did not provide competent evidence of her reasons for dismissing the malpractice suit. Absent that evidence, she could not meet her burden to make a prima facie showing she dismissed the malpractice suit because of the statute of limitations and thus was not entitled to summary judgment.

  1. (Coming and Going Rule) Hybrid in-office/remote employee driving from home to office was merely commuting to work at the time of traffic collision, not shuttling between worksites, so employer was not liable for employee’s negligence. Kai-Lin Chang v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (No. B340770 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22CHCV01194 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed April 28, 2026)

Plaintiff appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant related to an action where the plaintiff sued the defendant over a vehicular accident allegedly caused by an employee of the defendant while she was driving to work in the morning. The trial court ruled that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment under the “coming and going rule,” which exempts employers from liability for employee torts committed while commuting to and from work.

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the defendant failed to offer admissible evidence negating the possibility that the defendant’s employee was talking or texting with coworkers on her employer-issued cell phone at the time of the incident. Alternatively, the plaintiff argued the coming and going rule should not apply because defendant allowed its employee to work from home as well as at her office, and thus she was not commuting but traveling between job sites.

The appeals court found that it was not the defendant’s burden to negate all possibility that the employee was working at the time of the accident. It was sufficient that the defendant made a prima facia showing that its employee was not working, a burden that the defendant met through the employee’s deposition testimony. The burden then shifted to the plaintiff to provide contradictory evidence demonstrating a triable issue. The plaintiff in this case did not meet its burden.

The appeals court further disagreed with plaintiff that the defendant employee sometimes working from home converted her home to a second worksite for all purposes. Her uncontradicted testimony established that on Mondays, the day of the week the accident occurred, she did not work from home but at her office. Thus, at the time of the accident, she was engaged in an ordinary morning commute, not transitioning between work sites.

  1. (Confidentiality of Medical Information Act) Though Confidentiality of Medical Information Act breaches do not require proof medical information was actually viewed, educational technology company was not a covered health care provider. J.M., a minor, etc. v. Illuminate Education, Inc. (No. S286699 Second Appellate District, Division Six B327683 Ventura County Superior Court 56-2022-00567324-CU-MC-VTA)

Defendant is an educational technology company that collects data on individual students, including medical information, in the course of providing support and services to help school districts meet students’ educational needs. The defendant provides such services to a county where the plaintiff was a student. In 2022, the defendant became aware of a data breach that resulted in unauthorized access to students’ medical information, including the plaintiffs. The plaintiff through his guardian ad litem, brought a class action against the defendant for violations of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA; Civ. Code, section 56 et seq.). And the Customer Records Act (CRA; Civ. Code, section 1798.80 et seq.). The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim; and the Court of Appeal reversed. The California Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim under the CMIA or the CRA.

The California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had not stated the valid claim under the CMIA, because he had not sufficiently alleged that the defendant was a “provider of healthcare” within the meaning of Civil Code section 56.06. Second, to establish a failure to preserve the confidentiality of medical information under the CMIA (section 56.101), a plaintiff did not need to allege that the information was actually viewed by an unauthorized third party; confidentiality is breached when the information is exposed to a significant risk of unauthorized access or use. Third, because the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that he is defendant’s “customer” within the meaning of the CRA, he did not state a cause of action against the defendant and the CRA based upon the data breach.

  1. (Motion for Summary Judgment) Inadmissible evidence could not create a triable issue of material fact at summary judgment stage, so plaintiff failed to show City had constructive knowledge of dangerous condition on its property. Edwin Sargenti v. City of Long Beach (Noo. B340275 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV04367 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Seven Filed May 15, 2026)

While riding a rented electric scooter on a sidewalk in defendant City, the plaintiff hit a patch of asphalt, fell, and suffered injuries. He sued the City for negligence, alleging that the City had notice of the asphalt patch was dangerous and that the City negligently created or maintained the condition.

The defendant moved for summary judgment on several grounds, and the trial court granted the motion on one of them: that the plaintiff had signed a document that waived and released his claims against the City. After giving the parties the opportunity to provide supplemental briefs, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s order on a different ground: the City did not have actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition. In doing so, the appeals court held that serving an amended interrogatory response does not come without more, automatically create a triable issue of material fact. The appeals court also held that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931 does not authorize the court to consider inadmissible evidence submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment where the proponent claims it can cure the evidentiary defect at trial. Therefore, the appeals court affirmed. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment the plaintiff provided a screenshot from Google street view that purported to show the asphalt patch can be seen as far back as March of 2015. The City objected to the exhibit, arguing it had not been properly authenticated. The trial court had overruled the City’s objection, stating that the trial counsel can cure the defects at trial. The trial court reasoned that in The Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co. case, courts are authorized to consider inadmissible evidence submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment where the proponent claims it can cure the evidentiary defect at trial. Nonetheless, the court granted the City’s motion on grounds related to a release. The appeals court found that Code of Civil Procedure section 437c requires that the evidence relied on in supporting or opposing papers be admissible. The Court of Appeal noted that the Sweetwater case involved an anti-SLAPP motion, not a summary judgment motion. Sweetwater’s reasoning was based on procedural nature and underlying policies of anti-SLAPP motions that do not apply to motions for summary judgment. In light of this, the Court of Appeal concluded that Sweetwater did not displace section 437c’s requirement that evidence be admissible. Applying that principle here, the plaintiff failed to provide any admissible evidence of how long the dangerous condition had existed because the screenshot submitted for this purpose was not properly authenticated and was inadmissible.

  1. (Judges) Bad-faith blanket challenges seeking to disqualify a judge violate separation of powers, so a timely objection on those grounds allows courts to examine the reasons underlying such challenges. J.O v. The Superior Court (San Joaquin County Public Conservator) (No. S287285 Third Appellate District C102071 San Joaquin County Superior Court STK-MH-LPSC-2016-0000110 Filed May 28, 2026)

The California Supreme Court issued a unanimous opinion last month overturning its 50-year-old decision in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, which held the legislative guarantee the litigants of the right to disqualify a judge.

In this case, a judge was assigned to a Superior Court’s conservatorship court who admonished county counsel in a manner which was followed by the county counsel filing blanket disqualification 170.6 challenges to the judge, and over 300 cases in less than four months. The supervising judge had to reassign the judge to handle other types of cases. The trial and appellate court deemed the Solberg case controlling and overruled the objection to the 170.6 by the petitioner.

In reversing the appellate court, the California Supreme Court noted the volume and complexity of cases have increase significantly during the past 50 years, and court’s administration’s practice of developing specialty courts to handle similar matters more proficiently. Blanket objections have interfered with the court’s ability to administer justice and have given litigants the ability force a specialty judge out of assignment all together, at a great disruption to the Administration of Justice, in violation of the separation of powers between legislature and judicial branches of government. To resolve this conflict and while adhering to Solberg, supra, holding at the right of a litigant’s exercise 170.6 and good faith “is automatic” and new judge must be assigned without any judicial inquiry into the voracity of the affidavit oral statement, the California Supreme Court drew a distinction between 170.6 challenges made in good faith and those which, under the circumstances, indicted bad faith motive of singling out a judicial challenge for all future cases.

The California Supreme Court adopted and new procedure for evaluating 170.6 challenge for bad faith following the procedures widely utilized to object to a challenge or a prospective juror where the other party believed improper considerations like race, religion, or disability are at play. Consistent with Bastone v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, trial courts are now to follow a three-step approach to evaluating a 170.6 challenge to a judge. The opposing party can timely file an objection to a properly filed 170.6 by making a prima facie case that the opponent is lodging a bad faith blanket challenge to a particular judge. Failing to do so requires the granting of a disqualification. If the objection and supporting information indicate a possible bad faith exercise of 170.6, the burden shifts to the proponent of the 170.6 challenge to adequately explain the good faith utilization of the 170.6 challenge. A hearing would be held as soon as possible and if the court determines the challenge was made faith, the case shall be sent back to the challenged judge. If the court is satisfied that challenge was made in good faith, the case shall be reassigned, consistent with 170.6.

Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.