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California Law Update – February/March 2026

By March 31, 2026May 3rd, 2026Law Updates
  1. (Statute of Limitations) Sustaining demurrer to fifth amended complaint without leave to amend was appropriate where the plaintiffs failed to bring their medical malpractice claim against the demurring party within the limitations period. Lori Nichols v. Muhammad Alghannam (No. C100433 Super. Ct. No. CVPO19-01872 California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District (Yuba) Filed February 18, 2026)
  2. (Expert Testimony) By allowing plaintiff’s expert to present $1.98 billion lost-investment-gain opinion that had not been previously disclosed, trial court erred in accounting, as part of damages, that undisclosed investment appreciation. Shashikant Jogani v. Haresh Jogani (No. B338590 consolidated with B340239 and B342005 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC290553 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed February 24, 2026)
  3. (Vexatious Litigant) Trial court properly declared plaintiff attorney a vexatious litigant, required security posting, and imposed prefiling order after finding he met statutory criteria and had no reasonable probability of success. Benjamin Woodhouse v. The State Bar of California et al. (No. B346662 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25STCV02208 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed February 27, 2026)
  4. (Kelly/Sargon Expert Testimony) Because defendant abandoned a Kelly novelty challenge and instead argued reliability, the trial court properly evaluated expert testimony under Sargon and did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. Laosd Asbestos Cases Gary Chapman v. Avon Products, Inc. (No. B327749 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV05968 Case No. JCCP 4674 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed March 4, 2026)
  5. (Prior Similar Incident) Admitting evidence of prior similar incidents of tree branches falling from same species of tree in same neighborhood solely to prove the City’s notice of dangerous condition was not error. Lulin Yan v. City of Diamond Bar (No. B339583 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV18770 California Court of Appeal Second Appellant District Division Five Filed March 11, 2026)
  6. (AI Hallucinations) In propia persona litigants may face monetary sanctions if their court submissions contain fabricated citations and quotes generated by AI hallucinations. Anna Sheerer v. Thomas Panas (No A171804 San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 19FAM02588A California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Four Filed March 19, 2026)
  7. (Insurance) Where City alleged it was an additional insured under a service contract, Evidence Code section 1155 did not bar joinder of insurer and insured. City of Riverside v. RLI Insurance Company (No. D085905 Super. Ct. No. CVR12203266 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division One Filed March 20, 2026)
  8. (Privileged Communication) Former employee’s forwarding of privileged emails to her counsel triggered State Fund duties to limit review and notify the privilege holder. Guardian Storage Centers, LLC v. Julie Simpson (Nos. G064847, G064852 Super. Ct. Nos. 30-2023-03156616, 30-2024-01383640 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed March 24, 2026)
  9. (Patient Bill of Rights) Trial court erred in granting JNOV where substantial evidence supported jury’s finding that defendants’ negligence-failure to offer plaintiff a choice of caregiver gender-was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff harm. Jessica Duran Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care (No. A168792 Marin County Super. Ct. No. CIV1700712 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Two Filed March 26, 2026)

The above court decisions came to our attention during this last month. Please find below a summary of the court opinions for your consideration.

  1. (Statute of Limitations) Sustaining demurrer to fifth amended complaint without leave to amend was appropriate where the plaintiffs failed to bring their medical malpractice claim against the demurring party within the limitations period. Lori Nichols v. Muhammad Alghannam (No. C100433 Super. Ct. No. CVPO19-01872 California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District (Yuba) Filed February 18, 2026)

The heirs of a patient sued an anesthesiologist for negligent pain management and delivery of fentanyl leading to an overdose. One of the heirs of the patient filed a lawsuit against the hospital where the patient had received surgery to implant an infusion pump to deliver fentanyl for pain management. Over the next few years, the pleadings were amended several times, and eventually, all the decedent’s adult children were named plaintiffs. The pain pump was not mentioned in a complaint until the third amended complaint was filed over two years after the initial filing of the complaint. The anesthesiologist was first named in the fourth amended complaint, and the firth amended complaint was filed nearly four years after the initial complaint. The fifth amended complaint asserted causes of action for professional negligence; lack of informed consent; wrongful death; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and elder abuse. The defendant anesthesiologist demurred to the fifth cause of action on statute of limitations grounds. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and the heirs appealed.

The court found that the date of the decedent’s injury was the date of her death and that the defendant anesthesiologist was not named for the first time until five years after the death and well beyond the MICRA statute of limitations. Plaintiff sought to have this removed from MICRA based upon the physician having restricted privileges at the hospital where the care took place. The court disagreed stating that the physician’s hospital privilege status was not determinative but rather whether he had the capacity to perform the subject medical services pursuant to his professional license. The court also noted that the California Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act did not apply to the defendant physician for lack of an alleged a caretaking or custodial relationship between the physician and the patient. Accordingly, the claims against the physician were untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

  1. (Expert Testimony) By allowing plaintiff’s expert to present $1.98 billion lost-investment-gain opinion that had not been previously disclosed, trial court erred in accounting, as part of damages, that undisclosed investment appreciation. Shashikant Jogani v. Haresh Jogani (No. B338590 consolidated with B340239 and B342005 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC290553 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed February 24, 2026)

Family members sued one another over mismanagement and sale of real estate partnership assets. At trial, the plaintiff’s forensic accounting expert, testified that the sale of investments caused a $445 million realized loss. At trial, however, the expert went further and opined that had the sale not occurred those in sales investments would have appreciated nearly $2 billion, entitling the plaintiff to a much larger share. The jury adopted the larger damages figure, resulting in a multi-billion-dollar award. The defendants objected that the “lost investment gain” opinion had not been disclosed in the expert’s declaration or deposition. The trial court denied relief and the defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and vacated in part and remanded with instructions. Under Code of Civil Procedures section 2034.260, expert declarations must disclose the general substance of the testimony that the expert intends to offer. Moreover, experts may not offer trial opinions exceeding the scope of disclosed opinions where the opposing party was not provided notice and a fair opportunity to respond. Here, the plaintiff’s expert deposition testimony only disclosed the $445 million realized loss, without disclosing the potential gain. The expert stated in the deposition that the $445 million loss was the only theory by which that loss translated into damages, expressly disclaiming offering opinions about prudent investment strategies. As the expert’s opinion dramatically expanded the damages theory and became the largest component of the award, defendants lacked notice and an opportunity to challenge its assumptions. Accordingly, because the deposition testimony did not fairly disclose the opinion and permitting it was prejudicial, that portion was vacated, and the case was remanded to deduct the nearly $2 billion from the economic damages award.

  1. (Vexatious Litigant) Trial court properly declared plaintiff attorney a vexatious litigant, required security posting, and imposed prefiling order after finding he met statutory criteria and had no reasonable probability of success. Benjamin Woodhouse v. The State Bar of California et al. (No. B346662 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 25STCV02208 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed February 27, 2026)

Petitioner, an attorney, was placed on an involuntary inactive status by the California State Bar and filed a lengthy self-represented complaint against various corporate entities. The complaint alleged vast conspiracies involving genocide, mass decapitations, assassination attempts, foreign military forces, and the incineration of a federal judge. Similar lawsuits were filed in federal court by this individual that had been dismissed as frivolous and delusional, and he had been declared a vexatious litigant. The respondent moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 391 to declare the petitioner a vexatious litigant, requiring him to post security, and imposing a prefiling order. The trial court granted the motions, found no reasonable probability of success, ordered security, and entered a prefiling restriction. The petitioner failed to post security, and the action was dismissed. The petitioner appealed.

The appeals court affirmed indicating that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s orders that the petitioner met both statutory bases as a vexatious litigant: multiple unsuccessful lawsuits in preceding seven years, and federal courts had declared him vexatious on similar allegations. His appellate briefing reiterated the same extraordinary claims. California courts possess inherent authority to dismiss complaints that are frivolous or factually delusional. As a matter of law, the trial court correctly found no reasonable probability of success based on the allegations and the complaint.

  1. (Kelly/Sargon Expert Testimony) Because defendant abandoned a Kelly novelty challenge and instead argued reliability, the trial court properly evaluated expert testimony under Sargon and did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. Laosd Asbestos Cases Gary Chapman v. Avon Products, Inc. (No. B327749 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV05968 Case No. JCCP 4674 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed March 4, 2026)

The plaintiff maintained that she had utilized Avon’s talcum powder products since the age of eight in 1954, and for many years thereafter. In 2021, she was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease caused by asbestos exposure. Plaintiff and her husband brought product liability against defendant, Avon. At trial, plaintiff presented corporate documents and vintage talc products, studies, and experts to prove that the defendant’s products contained asbestos due to asbestos present in the mines where the talc was sourced. After a lengthy trial, and the plaintiff’s death, the jury awarded $50 million, with defendant apportioned 90 percent of fault. On appeal, defendant made several evidentiary arguments, including that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses’ testimonies, including a physician who tested over 90 samples, finding 77 percent positive for asbestos. Defendant contended that the Kelly/Frye standard required the trial court to ensure that the doctor’s testimony had “general acceptance” in the relevant scientific community.

The appeals court affirmed. It found that expert testimony may be excluded if it relies on improper matter, unsupported reasoning, or speculation. As gatekeepers, trial courts conduct limited inquiry to determine whether the expert’s methods and materials logically support the opinion pursuant to California Supreme Court’s decision in Sargon Enterprises, Inc v. University of Southern California. Novel techniques may require a Kelly showing of general scientific acceptance, but that requirement only applies if a novelty challenge is raised. In this case, the trial court properly admitted the doctor’s testimony. Defendant argued on appeal that the defendant relied on a novel technique requiring a Kelly analysis, but the record showed the defendant abandoned any novelty challenge and instead argued reliability under Sargon test. The trial court, therefore, evaluated whether the doctor’s methods logically supported his conclusions. The doctor described the testing process that was not novel and was supported by scientific literature. The defendant’s criticisms reflected competing expert views rather than clearly unreliable methodology. Because the testimony was not illogical, speculative, or scientifically unsupported, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it.

  1. (Prior Similar Incident) Admitting evidence of prior similar incidents of tree branches falling from same species of tree in same neighborhood solely to prove the City’s notice of dangerous condition was not error. Lulin Yan v. City of Diamond Bar (No. B339583 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV18770 California Court of Appeal Second Appellant District Division Five Filed March 11, 2026)

When a tree branch falls on a pedestrian on the sidewalk below is the public entity that planted and maintained the tree liable for the resulting injuries? The jury in this case concluded it was, based upon a jury’s finding that the tree constituted a “dangerous condition” within the meaning of Governing Code section 835. On appeal, the public entity did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict. Instead, it posed two evidentiary questions. First, did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that the other trees of the same species in the same vicinity have experienced “branch falls” in the five years prior to the accident issue to prove that the public entity was on notice of the dangerous condition? The appeals court held the admission of such evidence for the purpose was within its discretion. Second, did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting testimony of a neighbor who reported the prior branch falls, even when the neighbor was not himself an arborist and did not personally see the branch falls? In the unpublished portion of the opinion, it held that this also was not an error. Therefore, the appeals court affirmed the judgment for the pedestrian.

The Court of Appeal noted that evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the probability it will cause undue prejudice. Evidence of similar incidents on public property may be relevant to prove notice of the condition. Such evidence is admissible for that purpose if it is similar enough to attract the public entity’s attention to the dangerous situation at issue and impart notice. Here, the trial court admitted evidence of the prior branch failures of the Bradford pear trees in the same vicinity as the tree that injured the plaintiff. These incidents were similar enough to the incident involving the plaintiff to be admissible, involving the same type of tree in the vicinity. Moreover, the court found that the prior incidents’ probative value was not outweighed by the risk of prejudice because the trial court instructed the jury to consider them only for the issue of notice.

  1. (AI Hallucinations) In propia persona litigants may face monetary sanctions if their court submissions contain fabricated citations and quotes generated by AI hallucinations. Anna Sheerer v. Thomas Panas (No A171804 San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 19FAM02588A California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Four Filed March 19, 2026)

This matter involved a family law matter involving child support obligations between a married couple. In the partially published opinion, the appeals court addressed the issue of an in propria litigant submitting a brief containing fictitious cases, manufactured authority, and AI hallucinations. A recent appellate court decision issued a warning to attorneys that no brief, pleading, motion or any other paper filed in any court proceeding should contain any citations whether provided by generative AI or any other source that was not personally read and verified. The court in Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 431, emphasizes that an attorney who failed to heed the warning would face sanctions and potential discipline. Here, the Court of Appeal chose to extend this warning to in propria litigants, noting that the legal system is jeopardized when litigants falsify the truth, especially with technological innovations that can spin persuasive webs of untruths and invent legal principles or authorities. Thus, the court admonished all litigants to double-check citations, be truthful and responsible, and otherwise comply with the Rules of Court. The court further noted that while the court was at liberty to impose monetary sanctions for unreasonable violations, it chose not to, given the in propria litigant’s admission of his error in considering that it would not be in the best interest of the children in the underlying proceedings to create a financial burden on one of the parents.

  1. (Insurance) Where City alleged it was an additional insured under a service contract, Evidence Code section 1155 did not bar joinder of insurer and insured. City of Riverside v. RLI Insurance Company (No. D085905 Super. Ct. No. CVR12203266 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division One Filed March 20, 2026)

A family of a decadent sued the defendant City for a dangerous condition of public property. The City filed a cross-complaint against the company that it had hired to provide lighting assessments and its insurer. The City alleged that it was an additional insured under the insurer’s policy and the City asserted contract-based claims including indemnification and insurance bad faith. The City contended that its agreement with the lighting company required it to obtain insurance to protect the City against claims arising out of its work and that the insurer had endorsed the City was added as an additional insured. The insurer argued, however, that under Evidence Section 1155, an insurer and insured may not be sued together in the same action. The trial court agreed, dismissing the insurer, and the City appealed.

The appeals court reversed and remanded the matter. Evidence Code section 1155 limits joinder of an insurer and insured in third-party actions. However, under Royal Surplus Lines v. Ranger Ins., section 1155 does not apply to actions by an additional insured asserting contractual rights. Because the City’s assertions provided that its claims against the insurer were contractual, there would be no prejudice because the City was not a stranger to the insurance contract: the City was a first-party additional insured with contractual privity and standing to sue the insurer. Under Royal Surplus, such claims fall outside Evidence Code section 1155’s prohibition. The appeals court further rejected the insurer’s argument that ongoing liability claims created impermissible prejudice: cross-complaints are generally treated as separate actions, and any potential prejudice from the jury learning of insurance coverage can be mitigated through procedural tools such as severance or bifurcation. Finally, as the claims were contractual and coverage issues intertwined with the underlying dispute, the possibility that discovery against the insurer could affect the insured’s defense did not warrant dismissal as these cases would likely be deemed related and proceed in parallel, so requiring a separate action would elevate form over substance. Accordingly, because the City plausibly alleged additional insured status and contractual rights under the policy, joinder was proper.

  1. (Privileged Communication) Former employee’s forwarding of privileged emails to her counsel triggered State Fund duties to limit review and notify the privilege holder. Guardian Storage Centers, LLC v. Julie Simpson (Nos. G064847, G064852 Super. Ct. Nos. 30-2023-03156616, 30-2024-01383640 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed March 24, 2026)

After her termination, plaintiff sued her former employer, a storage company. During litigation, the plaintiff provided her attorney with internal emails between the defendant’s in-house counsel and company executives. Although plaintiff had originally received the emails in her role as an employee, she later forwarded them to her personal email account and supplied them to her attorney for use against the defendant. The storage company moved to disqualify the plaintiff’s counsel, arguing that the emails were privileged and improperly used. The trial court denied disqualification, reasoning that the plaintiff was the intended recipient and the emails were not shown to likely be used to the storage company’s disadvantage. The storage company appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded the matter back to the trial court with instructions.

When attorneys receive materials that reasonably appear to be attorney-client privileged and apparently impermissibly taken from the privilege holder, the attorney must refrain from substantive review and promptly notify the privilege holder. Failure to comply may warrant disqualification. This rule applies not only to inadvertent disclosures but also to materials improperly taken from the privilege holder.

Although the plaintiff was the original recipient of the emails in her corporate role, she later used communications in her own individual capacity against the storage company without authorization. The appellate court found this distinction critical: receiving the initial email did not entitle the plaintiff to disclose or exploit the communications in subsequent litigation. Importantly, the principles underlying the above-mentioned rule protecting the integrity of attorney-client privilege and the judicial process apply equally where privileged materials are intentionally taken by a client and provided to counsel. Limiting the rule to inadvertent disclosures would undermine those protections by permitting misuse of privileged information obtained through unauthorized means. Instead of treating employees as “intended recipients” her purposes of disqualification, the proper inquiry was whether counsel knew of should have known the materials were privileged and improperly obtained,
triggering duties to limit review and notify the privilege holder. In failing to analyze the issue under this framework, the trial court’s ruling rested on an erroneous legal standard.

  1. (Patient Bill of Rights) Trial court erred in granting JNOV where substantial evidence supported jury’s finding that defendants’ negligence-failure to offer plaintiff a choice of caregiver gender-was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff harm. Jessica Duran Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care (No. A168792 Marin County Super. Ct. No. CIV1700712 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Two Filed March 26, 2026)

After suffering a severe stroke which left the plaintiff paralyzed and nonverbal, she was hospitalized at defendant hospital, where she required intimate daily care. She later sued the hospital and its parent corporation alleging sexual assault by a nursing assistant and, separately, negligence based on the hospital’s failure to comply with the Patient’s Bill of Rights by not offering her the option to refuse intimate care from male caregivers. The jury rejected the assault claims but found that defendants were negligent, awarding noneconomic damages. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding insufficient evidence of causation and reasoning that, because the assault claim failed, the evidence of harm tied to that conduct could not support plaintiff’s negligence theory.

The plaintiff appealed. According to the Court of Appeal substantial evidence supported causation. The evidence showed that the hospital failed to ask or honor plaintiff’s preference regarding caregiver gender despite policies protecting patient dignity. The testimony at trial established that most female patients would prefer female caregivers and that the hospital would have accommodated such request, permitting the inference that plaintiff would have chosen female caregivers. Although the jury rejected the assault claims, it could still find plaintiff suffered emotional distress from receiving intimate care from a male caregiver against her wishes, through testimony that plaintiff cried, appeared distressed, and felt “violated” supporting this inference. Finally, the appeals court found the trial court erred by conflating the failure of the assault claim with a lack of actionable harm and by treating causation as requiring expert testimony. In so doing, the trial court mischaracterized the nature of the plaintiff’s injury; the negligence claim did not depend on proving assault, but on whether defendants’ failure to offer a choice in intimate care caused emotional distress, a question within common understanding.

Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.