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California Law Update – December 2025

By December 31, 2025February 28th, 2026Law Updates
  1. (Incarcerated Plaintiff) Because courts must ensure that all litigants have their day in court, trial court abused its discretion in not ensuring that incarcerated plaintiff had meaningful access to court. Jin Woo Park v. Michael L. Guisti (No. G063372 Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01207342 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed November 20, 2025)
  2. (Doe Plaintiffs) Defamation plaintiffs suing for events that occurred when they were minors could not proceed pseudonymously where no overriding interest overcame the public’s right of access to court records. Jane Roe v. Jenna Smith (No. B344378 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24STCV08102 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Two Filed November 21, 2025)
  3. (Plaintiff’s Negligence) Where the evidence shows the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of an injury, comparative negligence need not be submitted to a jury. Janice Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit District (No. F088135 Super. Ct. No. BCV-21-102362 California Court of Appeal Fifth Appellate District Filed November 26, 2025)
  4. (Restraining Order) Employee’s statement referencing workplace shooting that had occurred the previous year, coupled with his history with supervisor, constituted a credible threat of violence warranting issuance of workplace violence restraining order. County of Los Angeles v. Neill Francis Niblett (No. B327744 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22AVRO01811 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed November 26, 2025)
  5. (Government Claims Act) Trial court erred in denying plaintiff leave to amend pleadings to allege that defendant’s failure to register as a public entity’s excused noncompliance with the Government Claims Act’s presentation requirement. Andrew Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (No. B339694 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV36213 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed December 2, 2025)
  6. (Landowner Liability) Landowner bore no liability for insurance inspector’s injuries occurring on her backyard steps when, despite being qualified as a “hirer” under Privette, the steps were not a concealed hazard. Robert Andrews v. Kurt A. Wagner (2d Civil No. B332276 Super. Ct. No. 56-2020-00544222-CU-PO-VTA) (Consol. w/56-2021-00549500-CU-PO-VTA Ventura County California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six Filed December 3, 2025)
  7. (Arbitration) Trial court erred by not ordering individual plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim to arbitration, where death was allegedly caused by medical facility’s disconnection of decedent’s ventilator, not lack of custodial care. Ana Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County, LLC (No. A171351 Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 24CV069756 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Four Filed December 19, 2025)
  8. (Expert Witness) Trial court abused its discretion by allowing a tardily disclosed expert witness to testify at trial. Iain Paaruig Fancourt McDonald v. Areg Zargaryan (No. B329565, B331191 Los Angeles Court Super. Ct. No. 18STCV10066 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed December 22, 2025)
  9. (Amended Complaint) Despite defendant’s failure to answer amended complaint, default judgment was not appropriate where answer to the initial complaint denied allegations repeated, and necessary for claims asserted, in the amended complaint. Razan Ammari v. Sami Ammari (No. B336026 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19SMUD02318 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Four Filed December 24, 2025)
  10. (Attorney Misconduct) Trial court did not err by granting motion for a new trial due to attorney misconduct. Brenda Lee Allen v. Anil Bhula Patel (No. E082051 Super. Ct No. CIVDS2011244 California Court of Appeal Fourth District Division Two filed December 23, 2025)
  11. (Retained Control of Site-Bystander Injury) Where the hirer retained control over work and injured parties were innocent bystanders rather than contractor employees, trial court properly instructed that liability required substantial-factor causation, not affirmative contribution. Gloria Ruckman v. AG-Wise Enterprises, Inc. (No. F0860237 & F086187 (Consolidated) Super. Ct. No. BCV-15-101699 California Court of Appeal Fifth Appellate District Filed December 29, 2025)
  12. (Service Upon Corporation) Corporations Code section 1702 service on the Secretary of State is complete ten days after delivery, even if the Secretary has not yet forwarded the service documents to defendant. Socal Lien Solutions, LLC v. BDB Properties (No. B340151 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV28189 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed December 31, 2025)

The above court decisions came to our attention during this last month. Please find below a summary of the court opinions for your consideration.

  1. (Incarcerated Plaintiff) Because courts must ensure that all litigants have their day in court, trial court abused its discretion in not ensuring that incarcerated plaintiff had meaningful access to court. Jin Woo Park v. Michael L. Guisti (No. G063372 Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-01207342 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed November 20, 2025)

Plaintiff was incarcerated at a state prison. He retained an attorney to file a petition for writ of Habeas Corpus on his behalf.

The plaintiff later filed a breach of contract claim against his attorney, alleging that the attorney had failed to submit the habeas petition to the appropriate court. A trial date was set, but the plaintiff did not appear. The court then dismissed the action.

The plaintiff appealed, in pro per, arguing that the trial court committed error in dismissing the case. The appeals court agreed. It found that the dismissal deprived the plaintiff of meaningful access to the courts as an incarcerated plaintiff. Given the plaintiff’s multiple notifications to the trial court that he was incarcerated, the court abused its discretion by dismissing the case without ensuring that the plaintiff had a meaningful opportunity to present his case in court. Therefore, the appeals court vacated the dismissal and remanded the matter back to the trial. The appeals court determined that the case should be published in the official reports as a reminder that the court system must ensure that all litigants have their day in court. When those litigants are incarcerated, additional burdens will be placed on the courts, but they are burdens that society must bear in the interest of justice. The appeals court determined that the trial court should have explored reasonable alternatives to ensure that the plaintiff had his day in court.

  1. (Doe Plaintiffs) Defamation plaintiffs suing for events that occurred when they were minors could not proceed pseudonymously where no overriding interest overcame the public’s right of access to court records. Jane Roe v. Jenna Smith (No. B344378 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24STCV08102 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Two Filed November 21, 2025)

In 2022 the parties to this lawsuit were all students at the same high school. One of the students, a male, graduated in the Spring of 2022. In March of 2023, a female student began telling other students that the male student had sexually assaulted her and another female student. In April of 2023, the mother of one of the purported female students began telling parents of other students that the male student had sexually harassed her daughter. After an investigation, the school determined that the male student was not responsible for any of the claims that the female student had launched against him. In 2024, the male student and the purported female student victim sued the mother and the daughter who had claimed they had been sexually assaulted by the male student. They moved to proceed under pseudonyms, but the motion was opposed arguing that there was no basis for allowing adult defamation plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously, even if the claims arose from events occurring while they were minors. The court granted the motion. The matter was appealed.

The appeals court reversed, it found that litigation by pseudonym should only occur in rare cases if anonymity is not expressly permitted by statute. Also, a party’s possible personal embarrassment alone does not justify concealing their identity from the public. Here, the complaint related to alleged wrongful accusations of sexual misconduct while in high school. Although these were highly sensitive and private matters concerning minors at the time of the events, it was not sufficient to overcome the public’s right of access. There was insufficient evidence that serious mental or physical harm would result from the plaintiffs identities being revealed; the plaintiffs were no longer minors when the suit was filed; the allegedly defamatory comments were already published online in the public records; the suit was against private individuals; and the defendants already knew the plaintiffs identity.

  1. (Plaintiff’s Negligence) Where the evidence shows the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of an injury, comparative negligence need not be submitted to a jury. Janice Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit District (No. F088135 Super. Ct. No. BCV-21-102362 California Court of Appeal Fifth Appellate District Filed November 26, 2025)

Plaintiff was injured when she fell while riding as a passenger in a public bus operated by the defendant. The plaintiff sued the defendant and the bus driver. The operative first complaint alleged that the bus driver negligently operated the bus resulting in injury to the plaintiff and that the bus company was vicariously liable for the bus driver’s negligence. The trial court found that the bus’s video recording showed the plaintiff lost her balance and fell when the bus was moving in an ordinary manner. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was therefore granted and judgment entered in the defendants’ favor.

The plaintiff appealed. After independently reviewing the record, the appeals court concluded that there was no evidence defendants acted negligently, and the bus’s video showed the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury was her own negligence. The video displayed the plaintiff standing up on the bus when she was ready to get off at her stop. She held the railing with her left hand as she stood up and walked toward the bus’s rear door holding a plastic bag with her left hand and phone to ear in her right hand. The plaintiff grabbed another railing as she moved toward the door. She let go of the railing and stumbled slightly before standing by the rear door without holding on to the rail. The bus driver pulled the bus into a circle at the bus stop and turned the bus going north toward the next stop outside of the circle. As the bus was turning, the plaintiff holding a plastic bag in her left hand and a phone to her ear in her right hand, lost her balance and fell.

  1. (Restraining Order) Employee’s statement referencing workplace shooting that had occurred the previous year, coupled with his history with supervisor, constituted a credible threat of violence warranting issuance of workplace violence restraining order. County of Los Angeles v. Neill Francis Niblett (No. B327744 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22AVRO01811 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed November 26, 2025)

Defendant worked as a senior mechanic for the County of Los Angeles. In October 2022, the defendant acted in a verbally abusive manner towards a fellow employee, yelling profanities in his face. About a week later, the defendant stated to a secretary for the department, “if they don’t change things department, they are going to have another situation like they had with a former employee.” A year earlier, a firefighter fatally shot another firefighter at the station. In November, the County of Los Angeles petitioned for Workplace Violence Restraining Order (WVRO) under Code of Civil Procedures section 527.8, against the defendant, naming the employee who was verbally assaulted by the defendant as needing protection. After a hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant’s statement constituted a credible threat of violence, and it issued a WVRO. The defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. The defendant did not dispute that he had made the underlying statement knowingly and willfully. Also, since the referenced shooting a year prior, there had been a heightened state of fear among department personnel. Moreover, management decisions had previously triggered aggressive responses from the defendant, including profanity-laden verbal altercations. Given this, the trial court rationally could have inferred it was highly probable a reasonable person hearing the defendant’s statement would have feared for his or her own safety.

  1. (Government Claims Act) Trial court erred in denying plaintiff leave to amend pleadings to allege that defendant’s failure to register as a public entity’s excused noncompliance with the Government Claims Act’s presentation requirement. Andrew Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (No. B339694 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 22STCV36213 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed December 2, 2025)

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment at the trial court sustaining a demurrer in favor of the Public Transportation Services Corporation (PTSC). The trial court found that plaintiff had failed to allege he had complied with the Government Claims Act and California Government Code section 810 et. seq. (GCA) which requires plaintiffs to provide written claims for damages to public entities before filing suit against those entities.

On appeal, plaintiff claimed that the PTSC was not a public entity entitled to a prelitigation claim under the GCA. Assuming the PTSC was a public entity, plaintiff was excused from the GCA claims presentation requirement, because the PTSC did not register on the Registry of Public Agencies.

The appeals court disagreed with plaintiff that the PTSC was not a public entity for purposes of the GCA claim presentation requirement. The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) created a PTSC, a nonprofit public benefit corporation, to provide retirement benefits to workers who otherwise would be ineligible for those benefits if employed directly by the MTA. The PTSC managed and supplied the workers who carry out MTA’s mission, and its powers are limited to those MTA authorizes. Under applicable case law, the circumstances of PTSC’s creation and its relationship with the MTA established public entity status. The appeals court did agree with the plaintiff, however, that the PTSC’s alleged failure to register on the Registry of Public Agency’s would excuse plaintiffs’ noncompliance with the GCA. Although defendants provided evidence PTSC is on the registry maintained by the Secretary of State, they had not demonstrated that the PTSC also has registered with the Clerks of each County in which PTSC maintains an office, as required by the statute. Plaintiff therefore was entitled to amend this complaint to allege PTSC’s failure to register.

  1. (Landowner Liability) Landowner bore no liability for insurance inspector’s injuries occurring on her backyard steps when, despite being qualified as a “hirer” under Privette, the steps were not a concealed hazard. Robert Andrews v. Kurt A. Wagner (2d Civil No. B332276 Super. Ct. No. 56-2020-00544222-CU-PO-VTA) (Consol. w/56-2021-00549500-CU-PO-VTA Ventura County California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Six Filed December 3, 2025)

Plaintiff, an employee of an independent home inspection company, was injured when he slipped and fell while performing his work duty. He and his wife sued the homeowner, now deceased, asserting causes of action regarding negligence, premises liability, and a derivative claim for loss of consortium. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis of the Privette doctrine, which holds that an employee of independent contractor generally may not recover tort damages for work-related injuries from the contractor’s hirer. (Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 702 (Privette).)

The plaintiff appealed contending the trial court’s order of granting summary judgment was erroneous because the (1) defendant failed to meet her burden to establish that she was a “hirer” within the meaning of the Privette doctrine, and (2) there were triable issues of fact concerning application of the concealed hazard exception found in Kinsman v. Unocal Corporation (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659. The appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court found that the defendant qualified as a hirer because she authorized and benefited from the inspection arranged by her insurer and the relationship fell squarely within the “chain of delegation” contemplated by the Privette doctrine. But as to the Kinsman exception, the court found no evidence of a concealed hazard: the steps where the inspector fell were in plain sight; within the plaintiff’s inspection duties; and he admitted he simply was not paying attention.

  1. (Arbitration) Trial court erred by not ordering individual plaintiffs’ wrongful death claim to arbitration, where death was allegedly caused by medical facility’s disconnection of decedent’s ventilator, not lack of custodial care. Ana Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County, LLC (No. A171351 Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 24CV069756 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Four Filed December 19, 2025)

The plaintiffs, individually and as successors in interest to their mother, filed a complaint alleging negligence, statutory elder abuse, violation of California Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and wrongful death in addition to other causes of action against the defendant, a long-term acute care hospital, claiming that it failed to provide the patient with access to dialysis, failure to assist her toileting; and disconnected her ventilator tube causing her to suffer a severe anoxic brain injury, which ultimately lead to her death. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, which the trial court granted as to the plaintiff’s survivor claims, but denied as to the claims they filed in their individual capacities for the wrongful death, fraud, and violation of the UCL. The defendant appealed. While the appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided that Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 364.

The appeals court affirmed. It found because the complaint repeatedly stated that the death was caused by disconnection of the ventilator, the wrongful death action was rooted in professional negligence, not custodial neglect. It therefore should have been compelled to arbitration.

The court noted that if the patient agrees to arbitrate medical malpractice disputes in compliance with the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), the agreement may bind the patient’s heirs in the wrongful death action, even if the heirs themselves were never a party to the arbitration agreement. Wrongful death claims are not derivative of a decedent’s claim, but rather independent statutory actions accruing to the decedent’s heirs. Given the overlap between the acts that may have constituted medical negligence and elder abuse, the California Supreme Court in Holland determined that only acts or omissions by a skilled nursing facility in its capacity as a healthcare provider fall under the scope of professional negligence. By contrast, the failure to fulfill custodial duties such as providing food, hydration, and personal hygiene owed by a custodian who happens also to be a healthcare provider is at most incidentally related to the provider’s professional healthcare services. The disconnection of a ventilator amounted to professional negligence and thus not custodial neglect, therefore, as noted above, the claim should have been compelled to arbitration.

  1. (Expert Witness) Trial court abused its discretion by allowing a tardily disclosed expert witness to testify at trial. Iain Paaruig Fancourt McDonald v. Areg Zargaryan (No. B329565, B331191 Los Angeles Court Super. Ct. No. 18STCV10066 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed December 22, 2025)

Seven days before trial, counsel for the plaintiff blindsided defense with a new medical theory and medical expert. No emergency or extraordinary development justified this last-minute development. The plaintiff did not disclose this expert during expert witness designations. 16 months after disclosure, the plaintiff visited the expert for the first time the same day, the expert recommended costly and invasive spinal surgery, a theory never advanced in the case. The plaintiff did not move for leave to augment his expert list. Instead, he disclosed the expert’s support to the defense on the eve of the trial. Over defense objection, the trial court allowed the doctor to testify after a rushed deposition. The jury returned a substantial verdict for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.

The appeals court vacated and remanded the matter back to the trial court having determined that the trial court had abused its discretion. The appeals court noted that the Code of Civil Procedure’s expert disclosure statutes require timely designation of experts to prevent surprise and promote judicial efficiency. Permitting a late-designated expert to testify constitutes an abuse of discretion absent a reasonable justification for delay. The plaintiff failed to comply with mandatory statutory procedures by not seeking leave to augment his expert list. Plaintiff also offered no reasonable justification for waiting until days before trial to consult and disclose this expert as there is no medical emergency, new symptom, or unexpected development. Instead, the timing suggested a tactical decision tied to trial preparation. Finally, effective preparation to challenge a medical expert particularly one proposing major surgery requires substantial time and expert consultation, allowing for the deposition did not resolve the issues for unfairness. As the doctor’s testimony likely inflated the jury’s award for future medical expenses and pain and suffering, the error was prejudicial.

  1. (Amended Complaint) Despite defendant’s failure to answer amended complaint, default judgment was not appropriate where answer to the initial complaint denied allegations repeated, and necessary for claims asserted, in the amended complaint. Razan Ammari v. Sami Ammari (No. B336026 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19SMUD02318 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Four Filed December 24, 2025)

In this case, the defendant filed an answer to plaintiff’s original complaint but did not answer the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. After, the plaintiff obtained a default judgment and the defendant moved to set it aside. The defendant appealed the order denying that motion. The appeals court reversed. It found that the defendant’s original answer denied essential factual allegations asserted in the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. Without defendant admitting these allegations, the default judgment should not have stood. Therefore, the appeals court reversed the judgment. The court noted that when a defendant answers the plaintiff’s initial complaint but does not file a new answer to a first amended complaint, the original answer may serve to controvert facts reasserted in the amended complaint. With the plaintiff not submitting new factual allegations, a default judgment could not be taken against the defendant based on allegations the original answer denied.

  1. (Attorney Misconduct) Trial court did not err by granting motion for a new trial due to attorney misconduct. Brenda Lee Allen v. Anil Bhula Patel (No. E082051 Super. Ct No. CIVDS2011244 California Court of Appeal Fourth District Division Two filed December 23, 2025)

While staying at hotel with her family, the plaintiff and the hotel owner engaged in a physical altercation. The plaintiff sued the defendant and his company for personal injury. At the bifurcated trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff more than $1 million in compensatory damages. Two months later, it reconvened to try the punitive damages claim, but two jurors failed to appear. The trial court declared a mistrial as to that phase and discharged the jury. The defendant subsequently moved for a new trial based on irregularity in the proceedings preventing a fair trial. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s evidence was tainted by the plaintiff attorney’s misconduct, as he violated several motions in limine orders. The plaintiff also presented graphic evidence about her bowel and GI issues, which she claimed the incident caused. The trial court asked the plaintiff attorney if there would be evidence of causation, linking the GI claims to the altercation, and he told the trial court there would be which was false. The plaintiff’s attorney also presented inappropriate evidence and made improper arguments, including Reptile Theory, to appeal to the jury’s sympathy toward the plaintiff. Because of these and other instances of misconduct, the trial court granted the motion for new trial. The plaintiff appealed.

The appeals court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of misconduct. The plaintiff’s attorney made knowingly false or misleading statements and elicited inadmissible, prejudicial, and highly inflammatory testimony in violation of the trial court’s orders and warnings that he should not introduce evidence of the plaintiff’s incontinence unless he could establish causation with expert testimony. The court deemed this misconduct prejudicial because it was reasonably probable that defendant would have achieved a more favorable result in the absence of inflammatory evidence. Plaintiff’s counsel also committed misconduct by violating the Reptile Theory doctrine during closing argument. The court made it clear that during hearing a motion of limine number one, Reptile Theory arguments were improper. A violation of the Reptile Theory occurs when counsel asks jurors to base their decisions on concerns about their own safety and the safety of the community rather than applicable standard or care. The plaintiff’s attorney among other improper statements told the jury that it had “an opportunity to make a difference. We go through life to try and set an example, try and do the right thing. Maybe somebody will see, maybe our children will see. Maybe our students will see. But seldom do we have an opportunity to defend our community, and to champion our community, to stand as the last bastion for what we will tolerate for our community…That decision is going to be your decision in just a few moments.”

The appeals court concluded that the plaintiff’s attorney violated the Reptile Theory by telling a jury they had the power to claim to the world that in this community a person cannot put hands on another person. The closing arguments improperly urged the jury to enter a verdict against defendant as a way of protecting the community from harm in violation of the Reptile Theory. Other areas of misconduct including attacking the character and motives of the defendant and its attorney during trial.

  1. (Retained Control of Site-Bystander Injury) Where the hirer retained control over work and injured parties were innocent bystanders rather than contractor employees, trial court properly instructed that liability required substantial-factor causation, not affirmative contribution. Gloria Ruckman v. AG-Wise Enterprises, Inc. (No. F0860237 & F086187 (Consolidated) Super. Ct. No. BCV-15-101699 California Court of Appeal Fifth Appellate District Filed December 29, 2025)

Plaintiffs’ mother were injured when an underground natural gas pipe exploded during work performed by independent contractor and property controlled by the defendant. Evidence showed that the defendant’s corporate officer met repeatedly with the independent contractor’s owner to plan the work and regularly visited the site to ensure compliance with the defendant’s specifications. Plaintiff sued the defendant on a negligence theory based on retained control. At trial, over the objections of the defendant, the trial court instructed the jury on the retained control exception. The jury found that the defendant retained control, failed to exercise it with reasonable care, and was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs’ injuries. The defendant appealed, arguing that the instruction lacked evidentiary support and misstated the law.

The appeals court affirmed finding that the instruction was legally correct and tailored to the facts. Generally, a person who hires an independent contractor is liable to third parties for injuries caused by the contractor’s negligence in performing the work. However, numerous exceptions exist, including the retained control exception: the hirer retained control over the contracted work and exercised that control such that it affirmatively contributed to the injury. The facts in this case reasonably permitted a jury to find that the independent contractor was not free to perform the work in its own way, satisfying a retained-control standard. Next, unlike contractor employees, for innocent bystanders, liability does not require proof of an affirmative contribution; retained control plus substantial-factor causation suffices. In this case, because plaintiffs were innocent bystanders, the trial correctly omitted any requirement that the defendant’s conduct affirmatively contributed to the injury; a requirement applicable only to contract-employee plaintiffs.

  1. (Service Upon Corporation) Corporations Code section 1702 service on the Secretary of State is complete ten days after delivery, even if the Secretary has not yet forwarded the service documents to defendant. Socal Lien Solutions, LLC v. BDB Properties (No. B340151 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV28189 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division One Filed December 31, 2025)

The Corporations Code authorizes a plaintiff to serve process on a domestic corporation by hand delivery to the corporation’s designated agent. But when the designated agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found, the court may authorize service upon the corporation by hand delivery to the Secretary of State (the Secretary). Service in this manner is deemed complete 10 days later, regardless of whether the Secretary forwards notice of service to the defendant.

Here, the trial court voided a default and default judgment against the corporate defendant after the court determined service to be incomplete until the Secretary forwarded notice to the defendant, which did not occur until a month after the court entered the default judgment. Because the court’s determination is inconsistent with the plain language of the Corporation Code, the appeals court reversed.

Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.