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California Law Update – December 2024 – January 2025

By January 31, 2025August 23rd, 2025Law Updates
    1. (Statutory Offer to Compromise) Disagreeing with Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, simultaneous 998 offers to the same party may be valid to shift costs. Maritza Zavala v. Hyundai Motor America (Nos. D082747, D082940 Super. Ct. No. PSC1807879 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division One Filed December 17, 2024)
    2. (Dangerous Condition-Public Property) Summary judgment for a dangerous condition of public property liability under Government Code Section 835 was proper when Caltrans provided evidence that it had no notice of allegedly dangerous condition. Juraj Kabat v. Department of Transportation (No. G063082 Super. Ct. No. 30-2021 01214091 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed December 19, 2024)
    3. (Health Care) Hospitals have no duty under the UCL or CLRA to disclose fees for evaluation and management services (EMS) prior to treating emergency room patients. Taylor Capito v. San Jose Healthcare Systems, LP (No. S280018 Sixth Appellate District H049646 Santa Clara County Superior Court 20CV366981 Filed December 23, 2024)
    4. (Emergency Medicine Expert) Health & Safety Code Section 1799.110’s standards for emergency medical services applied in malpractice claim against physician, an on-call radiologist who remotely reviewed images for an ER patient on a “stat” basis. Charlie L v. Peyman Kangavari, M.D. (No. B327714 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV15446 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Two Filed January 2, 2025)
    5. (Negligent Security) Negligence claim against defendant football stadium security lacked causation where the incident occurred too quickly for defendant to intervene. Brooke Stokes v. Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC (No H050639 Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV357748 California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District Filed January 10, 2025)
    6. (Assumption of Risk – CTE) The assumption of risk doctrine applied to a plaintiff injured by an inherent risk of the sport (head hits), irrespective of whether the specific injury itself (CTE) was inherent to the sport. Alana Gee v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (No. B327691 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV43627 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed January 10, 2025)
    7. (Landlord Tenant) A commercial landlord consented to a month-to-month tenancy by accepting multiple months of rent following the expiration of a notice to terminate tendency. Laura Read Baca v. Yonghe Kuang (No. A171071 Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. 23CV027202, 23AP054588 & 23AP060272 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Five Filed January 13, 2025)
    8. (Federal Jurisdiction) A plaintiff’s amendment of complaint to remove federal-law claims divests of federal court of jurisdiction. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc., v. Wullschleger et al. (Argued October 7, 2024-Decided January 15, 2025)
    9. (MICRA) Wrongful death and medical malpractice claims were sufficiently separated and distinct to warrant separate non-economic damage caps under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act. The Superior Court of Orange County v. Los Alamitos Medical Center (No. G064257 Super. Ct. No.30-2023-01360050 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed January 29, 2025)

The above court decisions came to our attention during this last month. Please find below a summary of the court opinions for your consideration.

    1. (Statutory Offer to Compromise) Disagreeing with Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, simultaneous 998 offers to the same party may be valid to shift costs. Maritza Zavala v. Hyundai Motor America (Nos. D082747, D082940 Super. Ct. No. PSC1807879 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division One Filed December 17, 2024)

Defendant served a California Code of Civil Procedures section 998 offer which contained two different options in exchange for a dismissal. The underlying lawsuit involved a claim by the plaintiff under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act alleging that the defendant failed to honor its warranty obligations for the vehicle that the plaintiff had purchased. Under the first option, defendant would make a payment which would be a “portion” which would be sent to the lender to pay off any loan on the vehicle, with the remainder going to the plaintiff. The second option, rather than setting forth any specific monetary amounts, tracked the statutory language contained within the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

The defendant rejected the 998 offer. She prevailed at trial as well as prevailing on her motion for attorney’s fees.

The trial court disagreed with the defendant’s claim that the 998 offer cost-shifting mechanism was triggered. It deemed the offer not sufficiently specific because the amount of the incidental, consequential, and actual damages in the second option was not certain.

On appeal, the defendant argued that its 998 offer was sufficiently specific and certain to trigger section 998’s cost-shifting provision. The appellate court reversed. The court found that the defendant’s offer to compromise was valid and triggered cost-shifting under section 998 because it contained two independent options, the first of which was sufficiently specific and certain and in an amount greater than the jury’s eventual verdict. This appellate court division disagreed with the conclusion in Gorobets v. Jaguar 105 Cal. App.5th 913, which stated that simultaneous 998 offers to the same party were not effective. The Court of Appeal in this case instead reasoned that when faced with two simultaneous offers, a trial court can simply look at each offer separately to determine whether either of them exceeded the amount of the verdict.

    1. (Dangerous Condition-Public Property) Summary judgment for a dangerous condition of public property liability under Government Code Section 835 was proper when Caltrans provided evidence that it had no notice of allegedly dangerous condition. Juraj Kabat v. Department of Transportation (No. G063082 Super. Ct. No. 30-2021 01214091 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed December 19, 2024)

Plaintiffs’ child was struck and killed by a motorist as she was riding her bicycle across a marked, non-signalized crosswalk. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Transportation and others claiming that the property was a dangerous condition under Government Code section 835, due to the failure to address issues including inadequate signage and no signal. The Department of Transportation sought summary judgment, asserting in part that it was entitled to a complete defense under a design immunity. The plaintiff countered, noting that the design immunity did not categorically preclude failure-to-warn claims. The trial court disagreed and granted summary judgment.

The appeals court affirmed noting that Government Code Section 835 requires showing that the public entity either created the dangerous condition or had notice of it. The Department of Transportation offered undisputed evidence that it had no notice of a purported dangerous condition. The Department of Transportation maintained a comprehensive and particularized computer database tracking the number and type of collisions on all highways, ramps, and intersections. A check of the database for ten-year timeframe for similar accidents in the onramp area resulted in no comparable collisions. Considering the voluminous amount of traffic passing the area, this evidence supported the Department of Transportation’s claim that it had no notice of an allegedly dangerous condition.

    1. (Health Care) Hospitals have no duty under the UCL or CLRA to disclose fees for evaluation and management services (EMS) prior to treating emergency room patients. Taylor Capito v. San Jose Healthcare Systems, LP (No. S280018 Sixth Appellate District H049646 Santa Clara County Superior Court 20CV366981 Filed December 23, 2024)

Plaintiff filed a class action against the hospital challenging the evaluation and management services (EMS) fees for two emergency room visits. She did not dispute the hospital’s compliance with all relevant disclosure obligations, nor did she allege that the EMS fees were excessive or that she was charged for services not rendered. Instead, she claimed that the hospital had a duty to disclose the EMS fees in the chargemaster and provide notice of those fees before services were provided.

The hospitals failure to do so, the plaintiff argued, violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). After the lower courts ruled in the hospitals favor, the California Supreme Court granted review to determine whether hospitals have a duty, beyond what is required by the relevant statutory and regulatory scheme, to notify emergency room patients that they will be charged EMS fees.

The California Supreme Court affirmed noting that state and federal regulators have imposed extensive chargemaster and price list obligations on hospitals to increase the transparency in hospital pricing to enable consumers to comparison shop for medical services. In addition, state and federal law have sought to ensure that emergency services cannot be based on a person’s insurance or economic status. The Legislature has specifically exempted emergency rooms from mandatory, specific disclosures of costs to uninsured patients. In reviewing the various statutory and regulatory schemes, the California Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff had not established unfairness under the UCL statute which includes any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act of practice. The California Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish the conduct of the hospital’s unlawful under the CLRA and therefore affirmed the judgment.

    1. (Emergency Medicine Expert) Health & Safety Code Section 1799.110’s standards for emergency medical services applied in malpractice claim against physician, an on-call radiologist who remotely reviewed images for an ER patient on a “stat” basis. Charlie L v. Peyman Kangavari, M.D. (No. B327714 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 21STCV15446 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Two Filed January 2, 2025)

Plaintiff, a three-year-old, had a bowel condition for which he had multiple corrective surgeries. He went to an ER for abdominal pain and the physician ordered stat orders for an X-ray and ultrasound of his abdomen. The images were sent for evaluation to an on-call radiologist working remotely. He issued a report based on his review of the images, concluding plaintiff’s bowel was unobstructed. Soon after returning home, plaintiff vomited and turned blue. His parents brought him back to the emergency department, non-responsive and not breathing. He ultimately underwent multiple surgeries to remove tissue and the majority of his small bowel due to lack of blood flow caused by a bowel obstruction. He filed a lawsuit against the on-call radiologist who moved for summary judgment, and both parties offered the opinions of their respective experts. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff’s expert did not meet the qualifications of Health & Safety Code Section 1799.110, which requires experts testifying in certain negligence cases to have specific and substantial professional experience in an emergency department. The defendant never deposed the expert, but plaintiff’s expert still filed a supplemental declaration attempting to establish that he had the requisite qualifications. The trial court granted the summary judgment for the defendant, holding that the Section 1799.110 applied to the malpractice claims and to the experts.

The appeals court reversed and remanded. While it agreed that Section 1799.110 would be served by applying it to expert witness testimony including physicians serving the emergency departments of general acute care hospital, it also deemed both parties’ experts’ testimonies inadmissible because they did not adhere to the heightened standards.

    1. (Negligent Security) Negligence claim against defendant football stadium security lacked causation where the incident occurred too quickly for defendant to intervene. Brooke Stokes v. Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC (No H050639 Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV357748 California Court of Appeal Sixth Appellate District Filed January 10, 2025)

This matter involved a wrongful death case made on behalf of an individual who suffered fatal injuries after being attacked in a parking lot following a national league football game. The assailant was charged with a felony and he pleaded no contest to the assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily harm and he was sentence to one year in the county jail.

A lawsuit was filed alleging claims for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium against the management company and staffing services company. It was alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to prevent the assault, and in failing to provide reasonably adequate security.

The management company filed a motion for summary judgment challenging the plaintiffs’ claims founded in negligence, asserting that there were no triable issues of fact and that the management company did not breach a duty of care or cause the decedent’s injury. The staffing company filed a separate motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative for summary adjudication, similarly contending that it did not breach the duty of care and that any alleged breach was not the cause of injuries to the decedent. It also argued that there was no triable issue of fact that it owed a duty of care to prevent the unforeseen harm caused by the criminal acts of the assailant and that the staffing company could not be found liable for premises liability because it did not own, operate or control the parking lot outside the Stadium.

The trial court granted both defendants motions for summary judgment, and separate judgments were thereafter entered in favor of the management company and staffing company.

Plaintiffs appealed arguing that there were triable issues of material fact that both defendants owed a duty to the decedent, breached that duty, and their negligent acts and omissions in providing security to fans in the Stadium parking lot where a substantial factor in causing the harm to the decedent. The appeals court concluded that the record from the summary judgment motions presented no substantial, nonspeculative evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the acts or omissions of the defendants caused decedent’s injuries. Since the plaintiff could not establish causation or an essential element of their negligence and premises liability claim, the trial did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgments. The defendant’s evidence that supported their motion showed that adequate security was provided that the injury did not occur because of a breach of duty; it happened quickly, with no chance of intervention. The evidence failed to show it was more probable than not that a casual connection existed between the defendants’ alleged breach of duty and the decedent’s injury.

    1. (Assumption of Risk – CTE) The assumption of risk doctrine applied to a plaintiff injured by an inherent risk of the sport (head hits), irrespective of whether the specific injury itself (CTE) was inherent to the sport. Alana Gee v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (No. B327691 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 20STCV43627 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed January 10, 2025)

This lawsuit arose from the death of an individual who played football at a California College. He and others, who played college and/or professional football for many years were determined to have suffered Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE), by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The coroner in this case determined that the decedent’s death was due to combined toxic effects of alcohol and cocaine, as well as other cardiac conditions. The decedent’s brain was donated to the Boston University’s CTE Center for study where an expert in the field determined that he had Stage II CTE, which is now referred to as law level CTE.

The decedent’s spouse subsequently filed a wrongful death action against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), contending that CTE was a substantial factor in her husband’s death, and the NCAA negligently failed to take reasonable steps which would have reduced his risk of contracting CTE. The plaintiff chose not to name the decedent’s college as a defendant. The NCAA asserted an assumption of risk defense. It also argued that, as an unincorporated association, it could not be held liable for the failure of its members to vote to enact safety regulations. The matter went to jury trial where the jury found the special verdict that the NCAA was not negligent.

The plaintiff appealed from that judgment contending that the trial court erred in finding that the assumption of risk doctrine applied and in refusing an instruction she proposed on the liability of the unincorporated association for the acts of its members. The appeals court found that the assumption of risk doctrine did apply, and any instructional error relating to the NCAA’s responsibility for the action or inaction of its members was harmless.

    1. (Landlord Tenant) A commercial landlord consented to a month-to-month tenancy by accepting multiple months of rent following the expiration of a notice to terminate tendency. Laura Read Baca v. Yonghe Kuang (No. A171071 Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. 23CV027202, 23AP054588 & 23AP060272 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Five Filed January 13, 2025)

Defendant appealed from a trial court’s judgment and award of attorney fees against him in an unlawful detainer action. The plaintiff, a commercial landlord had issued a 30-day notice to terminate the defendant’s tenancy. Several days after the notice expired, the plaintiff tendered a rent check to the defendant, which she deposited that same day and never refunded. The next day, the defendant landlord filed an unlawful detainer action against the plaintiff, arguing that he was unlawfully holding over. While the action was pending, the plaintiff tendered payment of rent and common area maintenance charges to the plaintiff pursuant to invoices sent by the defendant through her management company for three additional months, which she deposited and never refunded. The trial court held that despite the plaintiff’s acceptance of these payments, she did not consent to the defendant’s continued possession based on the terms of their lease. In reaching this holding, the court concluded that Civil Code section 1945, which establishes a presumption of renewal whenever a landlord accepts rent from a tenant after the expiration of a lease did not apply.

The appeals court applying de novo review, found that section 1945 did apply because the plaintiff accepted rent from the defendant multiple times after his lease had expired. They further found that, in light of this presumption, that the plaintiff consented to a month-to-month tenancy based on the undisputed facts and the terms of the lease and therefore reversed the judgment.

    1. (Federal Jurisdiction) A plaintiff’s amendment of complaint to remove federal-law claims divests of federal court of jurisdiction. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc., v. Wullschleger et al. (Argued October 7, 2024-Decided January 15, 2025)

Plaintiff sued defendant in state court alleging that the defendant had engaged in deceptive marketing practices. Her original complaint asserted claims based on both federal and state law. Defendant removed the case to federal court based upon the federal claim, which gave rise to federal-question jurisdiction and also allowed the federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s factually intertwined state claims. The plaintiff did not want the federal court to be where her case was to be resolved. She then amended her complaint, deleting every mention of federal law, and petitioned the District Court for a remand to state court. The District Court denied the plaintiff’s request, but the 9th Circuit Court reversed finding that without a federal-question, the court concluded, there was no possibility of supplemental jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state-law claims.

On appeal to the to the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the 9th Circuit Court’s decision holding that when a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.

    1. (MICRA) Wrongful death and medical malpractice claims were sufficiently separated and distinct to warrant separate non-economic damage caps under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act. The Superior Court of Orange County v. Los Alamitos Medical Center (No. G064257 Super. Ct. No.30-2023-01360050 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed January 29, 2025)

This matter involved a case of a medical malpractice and wrongful death brought by the heir of the deceased and involved a dispute over recent amendments to the cap on noneconomic damages under Civil Code Section 3333.2 under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) and to the availability of noneconomic damages in survival actions that are Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.34. The question was whether or not the plaintiff was able to recover noneconomic damages under one or two MICRA caps. In this petition, plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition or mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the defendant medical center’s motion to strike portions of the plaintiff’s complaint that alleged her entitlement to seek two MICRA caps. The appeals court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were subject to two MICRA caps. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and directed the court to vacate its order and enter a new and different order denying the motion. The appeals court noted that under Atkins v. Strayhorn and under Civil Code 3333.2, a husband and wife plaintiffs suing in one action could each recover MICRA cap for their separate claims, the husband’s action for negligence and the wife’s action for loss of consortium. Here, the appeals court reasoned that a wrongful death claim and a survival claim (such as medical malpractice) were analogously separate and distinct to warrant separate caps. Further, the court noted that these claims included different recoverable damages and could have been tried separately.

Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.