California Law Update – February 2025

1. 1. (Statutory Offer to Compromise) Code of Civil Procedure Section 998 limits only prejudgment costs and fees-not costs and fees incurred to enforce a judgment. Caesar Elmi v. Related Management Company, L.P. (No. G062788 Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01105181 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed February 6, 2025)
   2. (Torts) Substantial evidence supported defense verdict on school district’s liability after plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of a teacher’s attempt to break up a fight. I.C. v. Compton Unified School District (No. B322148 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC665118 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed February 6, 2025)
   3. (Attorney-Client Privilege) Reports on meeting of review board that included legal counsel for purposes of assessing liability for past events and preventing exposure due to future events were shielded by attorney-client privilege. Frankie Greer v. County of San Diego (No. 23-55607 D.C. No.3:19-cv-00378JO-DEB United States Court of Appeal Ninth Circuit Filed February 10, 2025)
   4. (Medical Staff) Because the medical board of directors was not composed of licentiates, it exceeded its authority under Business and Professions Code Section 809.05 in reversing peer review committee’s decision to lift doctor’s suspension. Jason Y. Lin v. Board of Directors of Primecare Medical Network, Inc. (No. D084821 Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2313160 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division One Filed February 19, 2025)
   5. (Psychiatric Patients) Hospital’s writ request for County to stop sending mental health hold patients to its facilities was properly denied when its complaint failed to identify any legal mandatory duty violated by County. Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (Nos. C097671, C098311 Super. Ct. No. SCCV-CVPT_2019-1501 California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Filed February 25, 2025)
   6. (Whistle Blower Claims) Publicly operated health facilities are subject to Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5 whistleblower claims. Timothy Ryan, M.D. v. County of Los Angeles (No. B320677 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC606535 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Three Filed February 28, 2025)
   7. (Expert Testimony) Expert declaration concluding that medical negligence defendant acted within the standard of care without providing underlying facts and reasons was insufficient to satisfy defendant’s burden at the summary judgment stage. Sabrina Zaragoza v. Nadir Adam, M.D. (No. A168100 San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC21591784 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Three Filed February 27, 2025)

The above court decisions came to our attention during this last month. Please find below a summary of the court opinions for your consideration.

• 1. (Statutory Offer to Compromise) Code of Civil Procedure Section 998 limits only prejudgment costs and fees-not costs and fees incurred to enforce a judgment. Caesar Elmi v. Related Management Company, L.P. (No. G062788 Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01105181 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division Three Filed February 6, 2025)

Plaintiff rejected a settlement offer made by defendant, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The case was resolved for less than the amount of the offer. Consequently, the plaintiff’s award of prejudgment costs and attorneys’ fees were limited to those incurred before the defendant’s statutory offer to compromise. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the defendant’s offer was worth more than the case resolved for, and concluded the court did not err in limiting the plaintiff’s costs and fees.

Following entry of judgment, the plaintiff filed a second motion, seeking an award of fees and cost incurred in efforts to enforce the judgment. Although the defendant filed no opposition to the motion, the court denied it, reasoning the plaintiff was not entitled to any fees or costs after the defendant served its offer. The plaintiff appealed that denial, arguing the court erred because section 998 applies only to prejudgment costs and fees. The appeals court agreed with the plaintiff’s position and therefore reversed.

Post judgment costs incurred in connection with efforts to enforce the judgment are not governed by section 998. Also, defendants’ arguments on the merits of the plaintiff’s motion were forfeited because it did not file an opposition. The appeals court consequently remanded the motion to the trial court with directions to reconsider it on the merits.

• 2. (Torts) Substantial evidence supported defense verdict on school district’s liability after plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of a teacher’s attempt to break up a fight. I.C. v. Compton Unified School District (No. B322148 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC665118 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Eight Filed February 6, 2025)

Plaintiff, a minor student, started a fistfight with another student in class. The teacher intervened to prevent the two combatants from injuring themselves or anyone else. While pulling the student off plaintiff, the teacher fell onto plaintiff and broke his leg. The plaintiff filed a suit against the school district alleging the district had failed to train its teachers how to safely intervene in physical altercations between students and the teacher was negligent in attempting to stop the fight due to his physical condition (this teacher weighed 375 pounds and had been using a walker due to a back condition). The jury concluded that the defendants were not negligent and in fact the plaintiff and the other student was each equally responsible for harm suffered by plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed arguing that the judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted because there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s positions that the district’s lack of training was reasonable, and the teacher acted with due care.

The appeals court affirmed. The court noted that the plaintiff’s own witness stated that the district used the same training program as generally used throughout the United States, and further, that it is typically up to the individual teacher to exercise their best judgment when intervening in a physical alteration between students. Based on the evidence in the plaintiff’s case, the court found that the jury was able and entitled to conclude that the school district was not negligent. As a result, the court affirmed the judgment.

• 3. (Attorney-Client Privilege) Reports on meeting of review board that included legal counsel for purposes of assessing liability for past events and preventing exposure due to future events were shielded by attorney-client privilege. Frankie Greer v. County of San Diego (No. 23-55607 D.C. No.3:19-cv-00378JO-DEB United States Court of Appeal Ninth Circuit Filed February 10, 2025)

Plaintiff sued the County alleging he had suffered serious injuries while being incarcerated at the County Jail. After plaintiff settled his claims, the local newspaper moved to intervene to unseal documents from the County’s Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB) that had been produced in the litigation. According to the County Sheriff’s Department Policy, the CIRB’s purpose was to consult with legal counsel when an incident occurs which may give rise to litigation, to assess the department’s civil exposure, and to recommend remedial actions to avoid future potential liability. The CIRB consists of four commanders from various Department divisions and the Chief Legal Advisor. After the intervenors moved to unseal, the district court granted the motion, and the County appealed
.
The appeals court reversed, here, the purpose of the CIRB was to investigate critical incidents, examine potential liability and avoid similar future events: Policy required the Chief Legal Advisor to be part of the CIRB; there were no contentions that the Chief Legal Advisor was absent from the meetings memorialized in the reports; and areas of potential liability for inmates’ deaths were discussed. Accordingly, the CIRB reports met the criteria for attorney-client privilege. In this opinion, the court established the eight-part test is used to determine whether information is covered by the privilege. (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at the client’s instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by the client or legal counsel, (8) unless the protection is waived.

• 4. (Medical Staff) Because the medical board of directors was not composed of licentiates, it exceeded its authority under Business and Professions Code Section 809.05 in reversing peer review committee’s decision to lift doctor’s suspension. Jason Y. Lin v. Board of Directors of Primecare Medical Network, Inc. (No. D084821 Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2313160 California Court of Appeal Fourth Appellate District Division One Filed February 19, 2025)

The Board of Directors of Defendant Care Medical Network, appealed from a judgment granting the petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5) filed by the plaintiff physician. Plaintiff’s petition challenged the final decision by the Board in peer review proceedings regarding Medical Network’s summary suspension of the plaintiff’s privileges to perform patient care services. The main issue is whether, as the trial court concluded, the Board acted in excess of its jurisdiction and committed a prejudicial abuse of discretion when it reversed the decision of the Medical Network’s judicial hearing committee that plaintiff’s summary suspension was not reasonable and warranted.

The appeals court concluded that the trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s petition and affirmed the judgment.

The appeals court found that under Business and Professions Code Section 809.05, peer review is to be performed by licentiates, defined by Section 809(b) as licensed healthcare professionals. The only exception involves acute care hospitals. Here, the Medical Network was not an acute care hospital, and therefore, the exception did not apply. Unlike the judicial hearing committee, the Board members were not licensed healthcare professionals. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the writ based on the ground that the Board had exceeded its authority, committing prejudicial abuse of discretion in reversing the committee’s decision. The plaintiff’s patient care privileges were suspended the day after an incident involving a patient.

• 5. (Psychiatric Patients) Hospital’s writ request for County to stop sending mental health hold patients to its facilities was properly denied when its complaint failed to identify any legal mandatory duty violated by County. Siskiyou Hospital, Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (Nos. C097671, C098311 Super. Ct. No. SCCV-CVPT_2019-1501 California Court of Appeal Third Appellate District Filed February 25, 2025)

This case involved a dispute between a hospital and a local government over how persons who present with symptoms of psychiatric emergency medical condition are evaluated and treated in subject county. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, a hold may be placed on an individual who poses a danger to self or others, due to mental health disorder for up to 72 hours. According to the Plaintiff hospital, the county law enforcement regularly brought indigent Medi-Cal beneficiaries to its emergency department as 5150 detainees for psychiatric rather than physical care. Plaintiff brought a Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act violation claim against the Defendant, seeking order to prevent Defendant from continuing his practice unless physical, emergency care was involved. According to Plaintiff, the practice was harmful to 5150 patients because it was not a “designated facility” within the Act’s meaning and therefore not licensed to provide acute-level psychiatric care. Moreover, the practice severely burdened Plaintiff’s emergency services to the detriment of those needing emergency services other than psychiatric needs. The trial court disagreed, dismissing the Plaintiff’s lawsuit for several reasons including that it improperly sought an order compelling a discretionary act.

The Plaintiff hospital appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. It found that none of the statutes or regulations identified by Plaintiff including Medicaid regulations, disability laws, etc., included a mandatory and ministerial duty requiring Defendant to act in a certain way and therefore there was no viable cause of action. If anything, the laws favored the Defendant county’s actions. Under the state’s Patient Anti-Dumping Act and related laws, hospitals with emergency departments must, regardless of patient ability to pay or lack of insurance, provide medical screening examinations within the hospital’s capability and treat “emergency and Medical conditions,” including psychiatric illnesses, to stabilize the ailment. Finally, “psychiatric emergency medical condition” includes mental health disorders causing patients to be an immediate danger to self or others or to be immediately unable to care for their basic necessities due to the disorder.

• 6. (Whistle Blower Claims) Publicly operated health facilities are subject to Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5 whistleblower claims. Timothy Ryan, M.D. v. County of Los Angeles (No. B320677 Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC606535 California Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Division Three Filed February 28, 2025)

Plaintiff was a surgeon on the medical staff for a public hospital. He was terminated after his medical staff privileges lapsed and were not renewed. Plaintiff sued the public entity for retaliation in violation of Health and Safety Code section 1278.5, as well as other statutes. The plaintiff contended that the public hospital was performing unnecessary operations, and that the plaintiff’s supervisor was receiving financial incentives from manufacturers of various medical devices and that medical records were being falsified. The plaintiff claims he reported these concerns to public officials and departments. Plaintiff then claimed that the supervisor harassed the plaintiff among other accusations. The plaintiff filed two retaliation claims including the above-mentioned Health and Safety Code section violation. The public entity demurrered to the cause of action arguing that as a public entity it was exempt from this claim. The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The case went to trial where the jury returned a split verdict awarding plaintiff damages. Plaintiff contended in an appeal that because the public hospital met the definition of a section 1275.8’s health care entity it was subject to that law.

The appeals court reversed in part and remanded with instructions to the trial court to include the subject public entity as a health facility under the statute. It found that the statute defines health facility as facilities operated by the state, which also expressly excluding certain public-run facilities such as correctional facilities. The statute’s legislative history supported the conclusion that public entities are, with limited exception, covered by the subject statute. Accordingly, the trial court erred in sustaining the County’s demurrer on that issue.

• 7. (Expert Testimony) Expert declaration concluding that medical negligence defendant acted within the standard of care without providing underlying facts and reasons was insufficient to satisfy defendant’s burden at the summary judgment stage. Sabrina Zaragoza v. Nadir Adam, M.D. (No. A168100 San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC21591784 California Court of Appeal First Appellate District Division Three Filed February 27, 2025)

Plaintiff was admitted to a hospital with abdominal pain that was later discovered to be a bile leak. She underwent surgeries to treat the bile leak and related complications. She subsequently filed suit against defendants including a defendant doctor. Plaintiff contended that the doctor had been medically negligent and his actions fell below the standard of care during the performance of a cholecystectomy, which allegedly caused the bile leak. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment submitting the declaration of a licensed general surgeon. The expert surgeon concluded the doctor who performed the procedure within the standard of care and the bile leak was not due to any negligence on his part. The declaration did not state the facts and reasons underlying his conclusion, and plaintiff argued the declaration does not satisfy the defendant’s burden. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the doctor’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.

The appeals court reversed, it noted that expert opinions are only as good as the facts and reasons on which they are based, and trial courts should exclude speculative expert testimony. At the summary judgment stage, a moving defendant’s burden to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact cannot be satisfied by nearly stating ultimate facts and conclusions that are unsupported by factual detail and reasonable explanation.

Here, the defendant’s expert concluded that the defendant acted in the standard of care performing the subject surgery, but did not explain the basis of his conclusion. He did not explain the acts constitute due care during such a procedure, nor did he elaborate how he concluded the bile leak was not due to any negligence on the defendant’s part. In sum, the doctor failed to support his opinion with sufficient factual detail and reasonable explanation to show an absence of triable issue of fact.

Should you have any questions concerning these court decisions or desire a copy of any of them, please do not hesitate to contact our office.